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Abstract We introduce the notion of asymmetric programmable hash functions (APHFs, 
for short), which adapts Programmable hash functions, introduced by Hofheinz and Kiltz 
(Crypto 2008, Springer, 2008), with two main differences. First, an APHF works over 
bilinear groups, and it is asymmetric in the sense that, while only secretly computable, it 
admits an isomorphic copy which is publicly computable. Second, in addition to the usual 
programmability, APHFs may have an alternative property that we call programmable 
pseudorandomness. In a nutshell, this property states that it is possible to embed a 
pseudorandom value as part of the function's output, akin to a random oracle. In spite of 
the apparent limitation of being only secretly computable, APHFs turn out to be 
surprisingly powerful objects. We show that they can be used to generically implement 
both regular and linearly-homomorphic signature schemes in a simple and elegant way. 
More importantly, when instantiating these generic construc-tions with our concrete 
realizations of APHFs, we obtain: (1) the first linearly-homomorphic signature (in the 
standard model) whose public key is sub-linear in both the dataset size and the dimension 
of the signed vectors; (2) short signatures (in the standard model) whose public key is 
shorter than those by Hofheinz-Jager-Kiltz (Asiacrypt 2011, Springer, 2011) and 
essentially the same as those by Yamada et al. (CT-RSA 2012, Springer, 2012). 
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1 Introduction
Programmable hash functions Programmable hash functions (PHFs) were introduced by 
Hofheinz and Kiltz [30] as an information theoretic tool to “mimic” the behavior of a 
random oracle in finite groups. In a nutshell, a PHF H is an efficiently computable function 
that maps suitable inputs (e.g., binary strings) into a group G, and can be generated in two 
different, indistinguishable, ways. In the standard modality, H hashes inputs X  into group 
elements H(X) e G. When generated in trapdoor mode, a trapdoor allows one to express 
every output in terms of two (user-specified) elements g, h e G, i.e., one can compute two 
integers ax , bx such that H (X) =  gax hbx . Finally, H is programmable in the sense that it is 
possible to program the behavior of H so that its outputs contain (or not) g with a certain 
probability. More precisely, H is said (m, n)-programmable if for all disjoint sets of inputs 
{X1, . . . ,  Xm } and {Z1, . . . ,  Znj, the joint probability that Vi, axt = 0 and V j, azj = 0 is 
significant (e.g., 1 /poly(Z)). Programmability turns out to be particularly useful in several 
security proofs. For instance, consider a security proof where a signature on H(X) can be 
simulated as long as ax = 0 (i.e., g does not appear) while a forgery on H(Z) can be 
successfully used if aZ = 0 (i.e., g does appear). Then one could rely on an (m, 1)- 
programmability of H to “hope” that
all the queried messages X1, . . . ,  Xm are simulatable, i.e., Vi, axt = 0, while the forgery 
message Z  is not, i.e., aZ = 0. PHFs essentially provide a nice abstraction of the so-called 
partitioning technique used in many cryptographic proofs.
1.1 O u r contribution
Asymmetric programmable hash functions We introduce the notion of asymmetric pro­
grammable hash functions (APHFs) which modifies the original notion of PHFs [30] in 
two main ways. First, an APHF H maps inputs into a bilinear group G and is only secretly 
computable. At the same time, an isomorphic copy of H can be publicly computed in the 
target group Gt , i.e., anyone can compute e(H(X), g).1 Second, when generated in trapdoor 
mode, for two given group elements g, h e G such that h = gz, the trapdoor allows one to 
write every H(X) as gcx (z) for a degree-d polynomial cx (z).
We define two main programmability properties of APHFs. The first one is an adaptation 
of the original programmability notion, and it says that H is (m, n, d )-programmable if it is 
(m, n)-programmable as before except that, instead of looking at the probability that ax = 0, 
one now looks at whether cX,0 = 0, where cX,0 is the coefficient of the degree-0 term of the 
polynomial cx (•) obtained using the trapdoor.2 The second programmability property is new 
and is called programmable pseudorandomness. Roughly speaking, programmable 
pseudorandomness says that one can program H so that the values gcX,0 look random to any 
polynomially-bounded adversary who observes the public hash key and the outputs of H on 
a set of adaptively chosen inputs. This functionality turns out to be useful in security proofs 
where one needs to cancel some random values for simulation purposes (we explain this in 
slightly more detail later in the introduction). In other words, programmable pseudorandom-
1 Because of such asymmetric behavior we call these functions “asymmetric”.
2 For d =  1, this is basically the same form of programmability of [30].
ness provides another random-oracle-like property for standard model hash functions, that 
is to “hide” a PRF inside the hash function. This is crucial in our security proofs, and we 
believe it can have further applications.
Applications In principle, secretly computable PHFs seem less versatile than regular PHFs. 
In this work, however, we show that, for applications such as digital signatures, APHFs turn 
out to be more powerful than their publicly computable counterparts. Specifically, we show 
how to use APHFs to realize both regular and linearly-homomorphic signatures secure in 
the standard model. Next, we show efficient realizations of APHFs that, when plugged in our 
generic constructions, yield new and existing schemes that improve the state-of-the-art in the 
following way. First, we obtain the first linearly homomorphic signature scheme, secure in 
the standard model, achieving a public key which is sub-linear in both the dataset size and 
the dimension of the signed vectors. Second, we obtain regular signature schemes, matching 
the efficiency of the ones in [39], thus providing the shortest signatures in the standard model 
with a public key shorter than in [32].
In the following we elaborate more on these solutions.
Linearly-homomorphic signatures with short public key in the standard model Imag­
ine a user Alice stores one or more datasets D1, D2, . . . ,  Dt on a cloud server. Imagine also 
that some other user, Bob, is allowed to perform queries over Alice’s datasets, i.e., to compute 
one or more functions F i , . . . ,  Fm over any Di . The crucial requirement here is that Bob 
wants to be ensured about the correctness of the computation’s results Fj (Di), even if the 
server is not trusted. An obvious way to do this (reliably) is to ask Alice to sign all her data 
Di = m i  \ . . . ,  m (N). Later, Bob can check the validity of the computation by (1) download­
ing the full dataset locally, (2) checking all the signatures and (3) redoing the computation 
from scratch. Efficiency-wise, this solution is clearly undesirable in terms of bandwidth, 
storage (Bob has to download and store potentially large amount of data) and computation 
(Bob has to recompute everything on his own).
A much better solution comes from the notion of homomorphic signatures [11]. These 
allow to overcome the first issue (bandwidth) in a very elegant way. Using such a scheme, 
Alice can sign m i , . . . ,  m ^ , thus producing signatures o i , . . . , on , which can be verified 
exactly as ordinary signatures. In addition, the homomorphic property provides the extra 
feature that, given o i , . . . , on and some function F : M N ^  M ,  one can compute a 
signature a p,y on the value y = F (m 1 , . . . , m n  ) without knowledge of the secret signing 
key sk. In other words, for a set of signed messages and any function F , it is possible to 
provide y = F  (m 1 , . . . , m n  ) along with a signature ap,y vouching for the correctness of y . 
The security notion of homomorphic signatures guarantees that creating a signature ap,y* 
for a y * = F (m1 , . . . , m ^ ) is computationally hard, unless one knows sk.
To solve the second issue and allow Bob to verify efficiently such signatures (i.e., by spend­
ing less time than that required to compute F ), one can use homomorphic signatures with effi­
cient verification, a notion recently introduced in [20]. The notion of homomorphic signature 
was first introduced by Johnson et al. [33]. Since then several schemes have been proposed. 
The first schemes were homomorphic only for linear functions over vector spaces [3- 5, 12, 
14, 16- 18,22,24,35] and have nice applications to network coding and proofs of retrievabil- 
ity. More recent works proposed realizations that can support more expressive functionalities 
such as polynomials [11,20] or general circuits of bounded polynomial depth [15,26].
Despite the significant research work in the area, it is striking that all the existing homomor­
phic signature schemes that are proven secure in the standard model [3- 5, 15- 17,20,22,26,35] 
suffer from a public key that is at least linear in the size N  of the signed datasets. On one 
hand, the cost of storing such large public key can be, in principle, amortized since the key
can be re-used for multiple datasets. On the other hand, this limitation still represents a chal­
lenging open question from both a theoretical and a practical point of view. From a practical 
perspective, a linear public key might be simply unaffordable by a user Bob who has limited 
storage capacity. From a theoretical point of view, considered the state-of-the-art, it seems 
unclear whether achieving a standard-model scheme with a key of length o(N ) is possible at 
all. Technically speaking, indeed, all these schemes in the standard model somehow rely on 
a public key as large as one dataset for simulation purposes. This essentially hints that any 
solution for this problem would require a novel proof strategy.
Our contribution We solve the above open problem by proposing the first standard-model 
homomorphic signature scheme that achieves a public key whose size is sub-linear in the 
maximal size N  of the supported datasets; moreover, our scheme is context-hiding secure. 
Slightly more in detail, we show how to use APHFs in a generic fashion to construct a 
linearly-homomorphic signature scheme based on bilinear maps that can sign datasets, each 
consisting of up to N  vectors of dimension T . The public key of our scheme mainly consists of 
the public hash keys of two APHFs. By instantiating these using (one of) our concrete realiza­
tions we obtain a linearly-homomorphic signature with a public key of length O ( \ /N  + s /T ). 
We stress that ours is also the first linearly-homomorphic scheme where the public key is 
sub-linear in the dimension T  of the signed vectors. Concretely, if one considers applications 
with datasets of 1 million of elements and a security parameter of 128 bits, previous solutions 
(e.g., [4, 17]) require a public key of at least 32 MB, whereas our solution simply works with 
a public key below 100 KB.
On the power o f secretly-computable PHFs The main technical idea underlying this 
result is a new proof technique that builds on asymmetric hash functions with programmable 
pseudorandomness. We illustrate the technique via a toy example inspired by our linearly- 
homomorphic signature scheme. The scheme works over asymmetric bilinear groups Gx, G2, 
and with an APHF H : [N ] ^  G1 that has programmable pseudorandomness w.r.t. d = 1. 
To sign a random message M e G 1 w.r.t. a label t , one creates the signature
S = (H(t) • M ) 1/z
where z is the secret key. The signature is linearly-homomorphic -  S1S2 =  (H (t1 ) H (t2 ) M )1/z, 
for M  = M 1 M2 -  and it can be efficiently checked using a pairing -  e(S, g2) = 
Hi e(H(Ti), g f )e(M, g2) -  and by relying on that e(H(),  g2) is publicly computable.
The first interesting thing to note is that having H secretly computable is necessary: if 
H is public the scheme could be easily broken, e.g., choose M * = H(t) - 1. Let us now 
show how to prove its security assuming that we want to do a reduction to the following 
assumption: given g1, g2, g2, the challenge is to compute W l/z e G1 for W = 1 of adversarial 
choice. Missing g\ seems to make hard the simulation of signatures since M , S e G1. 
However, we can use the trapdoor generation of H for d = 1 (that for asymmetric pairings 
takes g1, h1 =  gy1, g2 , h2 = g |2 and allows to express H(X ) =  g ^ (y1,y2)), by plugging 
h1 =  1, h2 =  g2. This allows to write every output as H(t) =  = g ^ ’0^ ’1 z. Every
signing query with label t is simulated by setting M t = g- ct’0 and St = ( g f ’1). The
signature is correctly distributed since (1) St = (H(t ) • M t )1/z, and (2) M t looks random 
thanks to the programmable pseudorandomness of H. To conclude the proof, assume that 
the adversary comes up with a forgery M *, S* for label t * such that t * was already queried, 
and let S, M be the values in the simulation of the signing query for t *. Now, S = (H(t *) • 
M ) 1/z holds by correctness, while S* = (H(t *) • M*)1/z holds for M* = Mby definition of 
forgery. Then (M*/M, S*/S) is clearly a solution to the above assumption. This essentially 
shows that we can sign as many M ’s as the number of t ’s, that is N. And by using our
construction H =  Hsqrt this is achievable with a key of length O (\/~N). Let us stress that 
the above one is an incomplete proof sketch, that we give only to illustrate the core ideas 
of using programmable pseudorandomness. Moreover, note that the one presented above is 
only one of the possible cases of a forgery, but we think that it is the most interesting one to 
be considered in our example. We defer the reader to Sect. 4 for a precise description of our 
signature scheme and its security proof.
Short signatures from bilinear maps in the standard model Hofheinz and Kiltz [30] 
proposed efficient realizations of PHFs, and showed how to use them to obtain black-box 
proofs of several cryptographic primitives. Among these applications, they use PHFs to build 
generic, standard-model, signature schemes from the Strong RSA problem and the Strong 
q -Diffie-Hellman problem. Somewhat interestingly, these schemes (in particular the ones 
over bilinear groups) can enjoy very short signatures. The remarkable contribution of the 
generic construction in [30] is that signatures can be made short by reducing the size p of 
the randomness used (and included) in the signature so that p can go beyond the birthday 
bound. Precisely, by using an (m, 1)-programmable hash function, m can control the size of 
the randomness so that the larger is m , the smaller is the randomness. However, although this 
would call for (m , 1)-PHFs with a large m, the original work [30] described PHFs realizations 
that are only (2, 1)-programmable.3
Later, Hofheinz et al. [32] showed constructions of (m, 1)-PHFs for any m > 1. By 
choosing a larger m , these new PHFs realizations yield the shortest known signatures in the 
standard model. On the negative side, however, this also induces much larger public keys. For 
instance, to obtain a signature of 302 bits from bilinear maps, they need a public key of more 
than 8MB. The reason of such inefficiency is that their realizations of (deterministic) (m, 1)- 
PHFs have keys of length O (m2£), where £ is the bit size of the inputs. In a subsequent work, 
Yamada et al. [39] improved on this aspect by proposing a signature scheme with a public 
key of length O (m\[£). Their solution followed a different approach: instead of relying on 
(m, 1)-PHFs they obtained the signature by applying the Naor’s transformation [8] to a new 
identity-based key encapsulation mechanism (IBKEM).
Our results Our results are mainly two. First, we revisit the generic signature constructions 
of [30,32] in order to work with (m, 1, d )-APHFs. Our generic construction is very similar 
to that in [30,32], and, as such, it inherits the same property: the larger is m , the shorter can 
be the randomness.
Second we show the construction of an APHF, Hacfs, that is (m, 1, 2)-programmable 
and has a hash key consisting of O (m /£ )  group elements. By plugging Hacfs into our 
generic construction we immediately obtain standard-model signatures that achieve the same 
efficiency as the scheme of Yamada et al. [39]. Namely, they are the shortest standard model 
signature schemes with a public key of length O (m \/£), that concretely allows for signatures 
of 302bits and a public key of 50KB. One of our two schemes recover the one in [39]. In 
this sense we provide a different conceptual approach to construct such signatures. While 
Yamada et al. obtained this result by going through an IBKEM, our solution revisits the 
original Hofheinz-Kiltz’s idea of applying programmable functions.
We provide a detailed comparison of the schemes in Table 1.
1.2 O ther related w ork
Hanaoka et al. [28] show that there cannot be any black-box construction of a (poly, 1)-PHF. 
The latter result has been overcome by the recent work of Freire et al. [23] who propose a
3 [30] gives also a (1, poly)-programmable PHF which allows for different applications.
Ta
bl
e 
1 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 b
et
w
ee
n 
di
ff
er
en
t s
ta
nd
ar
d-
m
od
el
 s
ig
na
tu
re
 sc
he
m
es
 fr
om
 b
ili
ne
ar
 m
ap
s
Si
gn
at
ur
e s
ch
em
e
Si
g.
 s
iz
e 
(b
its
)
Pu
bl
ic
 k
ey
 si
ze
 (K
B)
o
CO
ii
ii
IOCO
o
CO
ii
7 
=
 1
28
[3
8]
 W
at
er
s 
(C
D
H
)
32
0
51
2
I'G
il 
+
 («
 +
 3
)|<
G2
|
6.
5
16
.6
[1
0]
 B
on
eh
-B
oy
en
 (#
-S
D
H
)
32
0
51
2
2|
G
2|
0.
08
0.
13
[3
0]
 S
ig
q_
SD
H
[H
W
at
]
(m
 =
 2
)
23
0
35
0
(«
 +
 l
)|
G
1| 
+
 |G
2|
3.
3
8.
3
[3
2]
 S
ig
q_
SD
H
[H
cf
s]
(m
 =
 8
)
20
0
30
2
(1
6m
2«
)|G
1| 
+
 | G
21
32
76
.8
83
88
.7
q-
SD
H
 [H
ac
fs]
(m
 =
 8)
20
0
30
2
r-s
/V
] (
['&
! | 
+
 |<
'G2
1) 
+
 |<
'G2
1
25
49
.2
[3
2]
 S
ig
q_
D
H
[H
W
at
, H
W
at
]
(m
 =
 2
)
23
0
35
0
(t
 +
 1
) | 
G
! | 
+
 (
p 
+
 1
) | 
G
t |
4.
9
11
.2
[3
2]
 S
ig
q_
D
H
[H
cf
s,
 H
W
at
]
(m
 =
 8
)
20
0
30
2
(1
6m
21
) |
G1
1 
+
 (
p 
+
 1
)|G
21
32
78
.4
83
91
.6
[3
9]
 
q~
DH
[H
ac
fs>
 ^
W
at
]
(m
 =
 8
)
20
0
30
2
r-s
/V
] (
|G
i | 
+
 |G
21
) +
 (p
 +
 1
) |
G
2 |
26
.6
52
.2
Th
e 
sh
ow
n 
va
lu
es
 c
on
sid
er
: 
(i)
 s
ec
ur
ity
 a
t b
ot
h 
X 
=
 8
0 
an
d 
X 
=
 1
28
 a
ga
in
st
 a
dv
er
sa
ri
es
 s
ee
in
g 
up
 to
 q
 =
 2
30
 s
ig
na
tu
re
s;
 (
ii)
 a
n 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
w
ith
 T
yp
e-
II
I 
pa
ir
in
gs
 w
he
re
 
|G
i |
 =
 p
 =
 2
X 
an
d 
|(&
2
| =
 2
|G
i |
; (
iii
) m
es
sa
ge
s o
f 2
X 
bi
ts 
so
 a
s t
o 
pr
ov
id
e c
ol
lis
io
n-
re
sis
ta
nc
e f
or
 X
 b
its
 o
f s
ec
ur
ity
; (
iv
) t
he
 si
ze
 o
f t
he
 ra
nd
om
ne
ss
 p
 =
 lo
g q
 +
 [
—
1 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 th
e 
an
al
ys
is 
in
 [
30
]. 
W
e 
co
ns
id
er
ed
 a
n 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 W
at
er
s’ 
sc
he
m
e 
w
hi
ch
 o
pt
im
iz
es
 th
e 
sig
na
tu
re
 s
iz
e.
 A
bo
ve
 E
xp
 d
en
ot
es
 th
e 
co
st
 o
f a
n 
ex
po
ne
nt
ia
tio
n 
in
 G
y 
Th
e 
gr
ey
 r
ow
s p
oi
nt
 o
ut
 th
e 
re
su
lts
 fr
om
 th
is 
pa
pe
r
(poly, 1)-PHF based on multilinear maps slightly changing the definition of PHFs in order 
to work in the multilinear group setting. Their (poly, 1)-PHF leads to several applications, 
notably standard-model versions (over multilinear groups) of BLS signatures, the Boneh- 
Franklin IBE, and identity-based non-interactive key-exchange. While the notion of PHFs in 
the multilinear setting of [23] is different from our APHFs (with the main difference being 
that ours are secretly computable), it is worth noting that the two notions have some relation. 
As we discuss in Sect. 3.1, our APHFs indeed imply PHFs in the bilinear setting (though 
carrying the same degree of programmability).
The idea of using bilinear maps to reduce the size of public keys was used previously by 
Haralambiev et al. [29] in the context of public-key encryption, and by Yamada et al. [39] 
in the context of digital signatures. We note that our solutions use a similar approach in the 
construction of APHFs, which however also include the important novelty of programmable 
pseudorandomness, that turned out to be crucial in our proofs for the linearly-homomorphic 
signature.
With respect to programmable hash functions, it is also worth to mention the recent work 
of Zhang et al. [41] which proposes PHFs based on lattices and uses them to build short 
signatures and IBEs with short key size.
Our work is also related to the research line on linearly-homomorphic structure preserving 
signatures (LHSPS). Structure preserving signatures (SPSs) are a particular kind of crypto­
graphic signatures in which messages, public key elements and signatures are all elements 
of a group over which there exists an efficiently computable bilinear map. In [35], Libert et 
al. introduced structure preserving signatures with linearly homomorphic properties: a bit 
more in detail, these signature schemes act exactly as other linearly homomorphic signatures, 
with the additional restriction that, as in SPSs, signatures and messages are vectors of group 
elements and the linearly homomorphic property holds with respect to the group operation. 
Moreover, the model adopted by works on LHSPSs is slightly different from the one of 
linearly-homomorphic signatures (as defined in [11,22] and used in this paper). In LHSPSs 
one signs vectors along with a vector identifier, and security is defined so that an output 
by an adversary is considered a forgery if it consists of a valid signature on a vector which 
does not belong to the linear span of originally signed vectors. It is known that a LHSPS 
(following this model) could be used to construct a scheme that signs messages (which can 
also be vectors) in a dataset, as in the model considered by this paper: given a vector v; at 
position i , one uses the LHSPS to sign the vector of group elements gui where u ; =  e; ||v ;, 
with e; the i-th column of the identity matrix. However, since in all existing LHSPSs (in the 
standard model) the size of the public key is linear in the dimension of the signed vectors, 
using LHSPSs yields solutions with a public key linear in the dataset size. On the other 
hand, it remains an open problem to design a LHSPS whose public key is sub-linear in the 
dimension of the signed vectors. Indeed, our techniques for reducing the public key size do 
not seem to work in the structure-preserving setting due to the fact that messages are group 
elements whose discrete logarithms are not known.
1.3 Publication note and  organization
This article is based on an earlier one [19] which appears in the proceedings of CRYPTO 2015. 
Besides including proofs and details that were missing from [19], in this version we added new 
results related to the context-hiding security of the proposed linearly-homomorphic signature 
scheme. More precisely, in this version we add a definition of context-hiding security, we 
propose a slightly modified version of our linearly-homomorphic scheme in [19], and we 
show that this scheme is also context-hiding secure.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the preliminary notions which 
are necessary in order to understand our work, such as bilinear groups and the complexity 
assumptions that we use to prove the security of our schemes. Section 3 is about the new 
concept of APHFs: we give definitions and propose two constructions of APHFs. Section 4 
contains our results on linearly-homomorphic signatures: we recall their definition and then 
propose our construction and prove its security (including context hiding). Section 5 includes 
our results on short standard-model signatures. Finally, we defer the reader to the “Appendix” 
for the standard definition of digital signatures and an analysis of the proposed constant-size 
FDHI assumption.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we review the notation and some basic definitions that we use in our work. 
Notation We denote with X e N a security parameter. We say that a function e is negligible
$if it vanishes faster than the inverse of any polynomial. If S is a set, x — S denotes the process
$
of selecting x uniformly at random in S. If A  is a probabilistic algorithm, x — A(-) denotes 
the process of running A  on some appropriate input and assigning its output to x . Moreover, 
for a positive integer n, we denote by [n] the set {1 , . . . ,  n}. Additionally, sometimes we will 
use a compact notation ga, for a group element g e G and a vector a =  ( a \ , . . . , a t) e Zp, 
meaning the vector of group elements (ga1, . . . ,  ga‘).
2.1 B ilinear groups and complexity assum ptions
Let X e N be a security parameter and let G(1X) be an algorithm which takes as input 
the security parameter and outputs the description of (asymmetric) bilinear groups bgp =  
(p,  G1, G2, G t , e, g 1 , g2) where G1, G2 and G t are groups of the same prime order p > 2X, 
g1 e G1 and g2 e G2 are two generators, and e : G1 XG2 ^  Gt is an efficiently computable, 
non-degenerate, bilinear map, and there is no efficiently computable isomorphism between 
G1 and G2. We call such an algorithm G a bilinear group generator. In the case G1 =  G2, 
the groups are said symmetric, else they are said asymmetric.
In our work we rely on specific computational and decisional assumptions in such bilinear 
groups.
Definition 1 (q-Strong Diffie-Hellman [10]) Let G be a generator of asymmetric bilinear
groups, let bgp =  (p, G1, G2, Gt , g1, g2 , e) —— G(1X) where gx, g2 are two random gener­
ators, and let q = poly(X). We say that the q-Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption (q-SDH) 
is e-hard for G if, for every PPT adversary A ,
Advq-SDH A (X) = Pr |A(g1, g1, . . . ,  g f , g2 , g2) = (c, g1/(z+c)) Z  p < ez
Definition 2 (q-Diffie-Hellman inversion [9,36]) Let G be a generator of asymmetric bilin­
ear groups, let bgp =  (p, G1, G2, Gt , g1, g2 , e) —— G(1X) where g1, g2 are two random 
generators, and let q = poly(X). We say that the q-Diffie-Hellman inversion assumption 
(q-DHI) is e-hard for G if, for every PPT adversary A ,
AdvA"DH! (X) = Pr |A(g1, g{, g2, . . . ,  g ( , g 2 ) = g j /z | z —— Zp j e
It is not hard to see that the above problem is equivalent to the one in which the adversary is
?q+1given the same input and is challenged to compute the “next power” g1 .
A weaker variant of the q-DHI assumption that we use in some of our proofs is the one in 
which the adversary receives only g2 , g2 in the group G2. For coherence with [32] we call 
this assumption q-Diffie-Hellman (q-DH).
Definition 3 (External decisional Diffie-Hellman in G1) Let G be a generator of asymmetric
bilinear groups, and let bgp =  (p, G1, G2, Gt , g 1 , g2 , e) G(1X).W esaythattheExternal
Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption (XDDH) is e-hard in Gi if, for every PPT adversary 
A, it holds
| Pr[A(gi, ga, g \ , gab) = 1 | a, b ±  Zp ] -  Pr[A(gi, g?, g \ , g\) = 1 | a, b, c ±  Z p ]| < e
Finally, we introduce the following static assumption over asymmetric bilinear groups, 
that we call “Flexible Diffie-Hellman Inversion” (FDHI) for its similarity to Flexible Diffie- 
Hellman [27]. As we discuss in “Appendix B”, FDHI is hard in the generic bilinear group 
model.
Definition 4 (Flexible Diffie-Hellman Inversion Assumption) Let G be a generator of asym­
metric bilinear groups, and let bgp =  (p, G i, G2, Gt , gi, g2 , e) ^  G(1X). We say that 
the Flexible Diffie-Hellman Inversion (FDHI) Assumption is e-hard for G if for every PPT 
adversary A:
AdvADHIW  =  Pr [ w  e Gi \{ 1 Gl} A W'
1 z r
= Wz : (W, W ' ) ^ A ( g 1 , g2 , g2, g v2 , gv,  gr1 , g V ) 1 z, r, v Z pj < e-
3 Asymmetric programmable hash functions
In this section we present our new notion of asymmetric programmable hash functions.
Let bgp =  (p,  G1, G2, G t , g1, g2, e) be a family of asymmetric bilinear groups induced 
by a bilinear group generator G(1k) for a security parameter X e N.4 An asymmetric 
group hash function H : X  ^  G1 consists of three PPT algorithms (H.Gen, H.PriEval, 
H.PubEval) working as follows:
H.Gen(1X, bgp) ^  (sek, pek): on input the security parameter X e N and a bilinear
group description bgp, the PPT key generation algorithm 
outputs a (secret) evaluation key sek  and a (public) eval­
uation key pek.
H.PriEval(sek, X ) ^  Y e G 1: given the secret evaluation key sek  and an input X  e X ,
the deterministic evaluation algorithm returns an output 
Y = H( X ) e G 1.
H.PubEval(pek, X ) ^  Y e  G t : on input the public evaluation key pek and an input X  e
X , the public evaluation algorithm outputs a value Y e 
G t such that Y = e(H(X), g2).
For asymmetric hash functions satisfying the syntax described above, we define two 
different properties that model their possible programmability.
The first property is a generalization of the notion of programmable hash functions of 
[30,31] to our asymmetric setting (i.e., where the function is only secretly-computatble), and
4 Our definition can be easily adapted to work in symmetric bilinear groups where G 1 =  G 2 .
Syntax:
to the more specific setting of bilinear groups. The basic idea is that it is possible to generate 
the function in a trapdoor-mode that allows one to express every output of H in relation to 
some specified group elements. In particular, the most useful fact of programmability is that 
for two arbitrary disjoint sets of inputs X , Z  C X , the joint probability that some of these 
group elements appear in H(Z), VZ  e Z  and do not appear in H(X ), VX  e X  is significant.
Definition 5 (Asymmetric programmable hash functions) An asymmetric group hash func­
tion H =  (H.Gen, H.PriEval, H.PubEval) t
an efficient trapdoor generation algorithm H.TrapGen and an efficient trapdoor evaluation 
algorithm H.TrapEval such that:
H .TrapGen(1\ bgp, gx, h 1, g2, h2) ^  (td, pek) 
takes as input the security parameter X, bilinear 
group description bgp and group elements gx, h 1 e 
Gx, g2, h2 e G2, and it generates a public hash key 
pek along with a trapdoor td. H.TrapEval(td, X) ^  
cx takes as input the trapdoor information td and an 
input X  e X , and outputs a vector of integer coef­
ficients cx = (co,... ,cd>) e Zd of a 2-variate 
polynomial cx  (yi, y2) of degree < d .
For all group elements gi, h 1 e G i, g2, h2 e G2 
such that h 1 =  gyi and h2 =  gy2 for some
y1, y2 e Zp , for all trapdoor keys (td, pek) —
H.TrapGen(1X, g1 , h 1, g2 , h2), and for all inputs X  e 
X , i f  c x — H
H( X ) =  gJX (y1 'y2)
For all generators g1, h 1 e G1, g2 , h2 e G2 and 
for all (sek, pek) —— H.Gen(1X), (td, pek') —— 
H.TrapGen (1X, g1, h 1 , g2 , h2), the distribution of the 
public keys pek and pek' is within statistical distance 
Y .
For all g1, h 1 e G1, g2 , h2 e G2, all keys 
(td, pek) —— H.TrapGen(1X, g1, h 1, g2, h2), and all 
inputs X 1, . . . ,  X m e X  and Z1, . . . ,  Zn e X  such 
that Xi =  Zj  for all i, j , we have
Pr[cxj,o =  • • • =  cxm ,0 
=  0 A cZj,0,
Correctness:
Statistically-close trapdoor keys:
Well distributed logarithms:
, cZn,0 =  0 ]> S
where cx t —H.TrapEval(td, Xi ) and CZj —H.
TrapEval(td, Z j ), and cxt,0 (resp. cZj,0) is the coef­
ficient of the term of degree 0. The probability is over 
the trapdoor td that was produced along with pek.
If y  is negligible and S is noticeable we simply say that H is (m, n, d)-programmable. 
Furthermore, if m (resp. n) is an arbitrary polynomial in X, then we say that H is (poly, n, d)- 
programmable (resp. (m, poly, d)-programmable). Finally, if H admits trapdoor algorithms 
that satisfy only the first three properties, then H is said simply (d, y ) -programmable. Note 
that any H that is (m, n, d ,Y ,  S)-programmable is also (d, y ) -programmable.
Programmable pseudorandomness The second main programmability property that we 
define for asymmetric hash functions is quite different from the previous one. It is called 
programmable pseudorandomness, and very intuitively it says that, when using the hash 
function in trapdoor mode, it is possible to “embed” a PRF into it. More precisely, the 
trapdoor algorithms satisfy programmable pseudorandomness if they allow to generate keys 
such that even by observing pek and H(X ) for a bunch of inputs X , then the elements g ^ ’0 
look random. The formal definition follows:
Definition 6 (Asymmetric hash functions with programmable pseudorandomness) An asym­
metric hash function H =  (H.Gen, H.PriEval’ H.PubEval) has (d, y, e)-programmable 
pseudorandomness if there exist efficient trapdoor algorithms H.TrapGen, H.TrapEval that 
satisfy the properties of syntax, correctness, and y -statistically-close trapdoor keys as in 
Definition 5, and additionally satisfy the following property with parameter e:
Pseudorandomness: Let b e {0, 1} and let Exp^Rj*-b(X) be the following experiment 
between an adversary A  and a challenger.
1. Generate bgp —— 5(1X), andrun A(bgp), that outputs two generators h1 e G ^ h2 e G2.
2. Compute (td, pek) — H.TrapGen(1A, g 1 , h ^  g2 , h2) and run A(pek) with access to 
the following oracle:
-  If b = 0, A  is given O(-) that on input X  e X  returns H(X ) =  g ^ (y1’y2) and g^ ’0, 
where cX —-H.TrapEval (td, X );
-  If b = 1, A  is given 'R.(-) that on input X  e X  returns H(X) =  gCX(yuy2) and gr1X,
$for a randomly chosen i x  —  Zp (which is unique for every X  e X ).
3. At the end the adversary outputs a bit b ' , and b' is returned as the output of the experiment. 
Then we say that H.TrapGen, H.TrapEval satisfy pseudorandomness for e, if for all PPT 
A
|P r[E xp™ f-0(X) = 1 ] -  P r[E x p ^H -1 (X) = 1]| < e
where the probabilities are taken over all the random choices of TrapGen, the oracle R  
and the adversary A .
Remark 1 (On the mutual existence of programmability and programmable pseudorandom­
ness) We stress that the two properties of programmability and programmable pseudoran­
domness defined above are mutually exclusive. Precisely, an APHF can have a pair of trapdoor 
algorithms (TrapGen, TrapEval) that admits either (m, n, d ’ / ’ ^-programmability (for 
non-negligible S), or (d, y, e)-programmable pseudorandomness (for negligible e). Intu­
itively, the reason why the same trapdoor algorithms cannot satisfy both properties is 
that (m, n,S,  y ) -programmability implies that for any elements X 1 , . . . ,  X m e X  it holds 
cXi,0 =  0 with non negligible probability S. However, if this holds then programmable pseu­
dorandomness can be trivially broken, since g1Xi ,0 =  1 with non negligible probability S.
On the other hand, it is quite interesting to observe that the same function can enjoy 
both properties through different, appropriate, pairs of trapdoor algorithms. In fact, an asym­
metric group hash function can have a pair of trapdoor algorithms (TrapGen, TrapEval) 
for which (m, n,S,  y)-programmability holds, and another pair of trapdoor algorithms 
(TrapGen', TrapEval') for which (d, y, S)-programmable pseudorandomness holds. Then, 
since all trapdoor generations produce keys that are statistically indistinguishable from the 
real ones it follows that also the two trapdoor modes are statistically indistinguishable. In a
nutshell, this means that the same function can be programmed in different modes in different 
steps of a security proof, a property which turns out to be very useful, for example, in our 
proofs of Sect. 4.4.
O ther variants of programmability Here we define two other variants of the programma­
bility notion given in Definition 5.
Weak programmability We consider a weak version of the above programmability property 
in which one fixes at key generation time the n inputs Zj on which cZj,0 =  0.
Definition 7 (Asymmetric weakly-programmable hashfunctions) An asymmetric group hash 
function H =  (H.Gen, H.PriEval, H.PubEval)
there exist efficient trapdoor generation H.TrapGen and trapdoor evaluation H.TrapEval 
algorithms such that:
-  Syntax: H.TrapGen(1X, bgp, gi, h 1, g2, h2 , Z 1, . . . ,  Z n) ^  (td, pek) takes as input 
the security parameter X, bilinear group description bgp, group elements gi, h 1 e 
G i, g2 , h 2 e G2, and a set of n inputs Z 1, . . . ,  Z n e X  . I t  generates a public hash 
key pek along with a trapdoor td. H.TrapEval(td, X ) ^  cx works exactly as in Defini­
tion 5.
-  The properties of correctness and statistically-close trapdoor keys hold as in Defini­
tion 5. The property of well-distributed logarithms is also the same except that the inputs 
Z1, . . . ,  Zn are the ones fixed as input to H.TrapGen.
Degree-d programmability In our work we also consider a variant of the above definition 
in which the property of well distributed logarithms is stated with respect to the degree­
d coefficients of the polynomials generated by H.TrapEval. In this case, we say that H is 
(m, n, d, y, 8)-degree-d-programmable.
3.1 Relation with existing notions
Before describing our realizations of APHFs, we discuss here the relation between our new 
notion and two existing notions of programmable hash functions: the original one by Hofheinz 
and Kiltz [30], recalled in “Appendix C”, and its adaptation to the multilinear setting recently 
proposed by Freire et al. [23].
When working over bilinear groups, the notion of programmable hash functions of [30] is 
essentially a special case of ours. The main differences are: (1) PHFs are publicly computable, 
(2) the trapdoor algorithms work with only two generators g, h and every output of the 
function can be expressed as a linear function gahb of these two generators. As we formally 
state in the following theorem, a standard PHF is an APHF for d =  1:
Theorem 1 Let H =  (PHF.Gen, PHF.Eval) be an (m, n, y, 8) -programmable hash func­
tion such that H : X  ^  G 1. Define H.Gen =  PHF.Gen, H.PriEval =  PHF.Eval and 
(informally) H.PubEval =  e(PHF.Eval, g2). Then H =  (H.Gen, H.PriEval, H.PubEval)
is an asymmetric (m, n, 1, y, 8)-programmable hash function.
The proof is straightforward and is omitted.
Second, we analyze the relation between asymmetric hash functions and the PHFs in the 
multilinear setting introduced in [23]. Informally, for a setting of leveled multilinear groups
G1, . . . ,  G i, [231 considers a group hash function H : X  ^  Gi. Then, H is said (m, n)- 
programmable i f  there exist two trapdoor algorithms PHF.TrapGen, PHF.TrapEval such
that: PHF.TrapGen(1X, g 1, . . . ,  gi, h) takes as input g i , h e G1 with h = 1 and outputs a
trapdoor td and hash key hk; PHF.TrapEval(td, X ) on input X  outputs an integer ax  and 
an element Bx e G t-1 such that H(X) =  e(gi, . . . ,  gt)axe( B x , h) e Gt. If we consider 
leveled bilinear groups where G =  G1 and G t = G2, then asymmetric programmable hash 
functions (for d < 2) imply PHFs in the (symmetric) bilinear group setting:
Theorem 2 Let G, G j be symmetric bilinear groups, and let H =  (H.Gen, H.PriEval, 
H.PubEval) be an asymmetric (m, n, 2, y, 8)-programmable hash function such that H : 
X  ^  G. Define PHF.Gen =  H.Gen and PHF.Eval =  H.PubEval. Then H =  
(PHF.G en , PHF .Eval) is an (m, n, y, 8)-programmable hash function in the bilinear set­
ting.
The proof is fairly easy. Here we provide a sketch. Basically, by assuming that H is pro­
grammable, we have to show two algorithms PHF.TrapGen, PHF.TrapEval that satisfy the 
programmability of H in the bilinear setting:
PHF.TrapGen(1A, g, h): run (td, pek) H.TrapGen(1A, g, h) and output (td, pek).
PHF.TrapEval(td, X): run cX^H.TrapEval(td, X) to generate the coefficient of a 
degree-2 polynomial cX(y) where y =  DLogg(h) . Then output 
aX = cx,0, and Bx = gcX,1 hcX,2.
It is easy to see that if cx  is such that H(X ) =  gcx,°+cx,1 y+cxay2 then
H(X) =  e(H(X), g) = e(g, g)cx,°e(gcx,1+cx,2y, gy) =  e(g, g)axe( B x , h)
Finally, the (m, n, y, 8)-programmability of H is immediately implied by the well distribution 
of the discrete logarithms in H for parameters (m, n, 2, y, 8).
3.2 An asym m etric program m able hash function based on cover-free sets
In this section we present the construction of an asymmetric hash function, Hacfs, based on 
cover-free sets. Our construction uses ideas similar to the ones used by Hofheinz, Jager and 
Kiltz [32] to design a (regular) programmable hash function. Our construction extends these 
ideas with a technique that allows us to obtain a much shorter public key. Concretely, for binary 
inputs of size t ,  the programmable hash function Hcfs in [32] is (m, 1)-programmable with a 
hash key of length O ( tm2). In contrast, our new construction Hacfs is (m, 1)-programmable 
with a hash key of length O (m \ft). While such improvement is obtained at the price of 
obtaining the function in the secret-key model, our results of Sect. 5 show that asymmetric 
programmable hash are still useful to build short bilinear-map signatures, whose efficiency, 
in terms of signature’s and key’s length matches that of state-of-the-art schemes [39].
Before proceeding with describing our function, below we recall the notion of cover-free 
sets.
Cover-free families If S, V are sets, we say that S does not cover V if S ^  V . Let T , m, s 
be positive integers, and let F = {Fi} e[s] be a family of subsets of [T]. A family F  is said to 
be m-cover-free over [T], if for any subset I  C [s] of cardinality at most m, then the union 
U eiFi does not cover Fj for all j  e I . More formally, for any I  C [s] such that 111 < m , 
and any j  e I , U  ei F; ^  F j . Furthermore, we say that F  is w-uniformif every subset Fi in 
the family have size w. In our construction, we use the following fact from [21,34]:
Lemma 1 [21,34] There is a deterministic polynomial time algorithm that, on input integers 
s = 2t and m, returns w, T, F where F = {Fi} e[s] is a w-uniform, m-cover-free family 
over [T],for w = T/4m and T < 16m2t.
The construction o f Hacfs Let Q(1X) be a bilinear group generator, let bgp =  (p,  G i, G2, 
Gt , gi, g2 , e) be an instance of bilinear group parameters generated by Q. Let t  = t(X) and 
m = m (X) be two polynomials in the security parameter. We set s = 2t , T = 16m21, and 
w = T/4m  as for Lemma 1, and define t = f\/T"|. Note that every integer k e [T] can be 
written as a pair of integers (i, j ) e [t] x [t] using some canonical mapping. For the sake of 
simplicity, sometimes we abuse notation and write (i, j ) e [T] where i, j  e [t].
In the following we describe the asymmetric hash function Hacfs =  (H.Gen, H.PriEval, 
H.PubEval) that maps Hacfs : X  ^  G1 where X  = {0, 1}t . In particular, every input
X  e {0, 1}t is associated to a set Fi, i e [2t ], by interpreting X  as an integer in {0, 
and by setting i = X  + 1. We call Fx such subset associated to X .
, 2t -1 }
H.Gen(1X, bgp): 
H.PriEval(sek, X ):
H.PubEval(pek, X):
for i = 1 to t , sample ai , fri —  Zp and compute Ai = 
g ^ , Bi = g f . Finally, set sek  =  {ai }t=1, pek =  
{A i, Bi }t=1, and return (sek, pek).
first, compute the subset Fx Q [T] associated to X  e {0, 1}£, 
and then return
Y = g £ (i,j)eFx ai j e G1
let Fx Q [T] be the subset associated to X , and compute
7 =  e(Ai , B j ) = e(H(X), g2)
(i,j )e Fx
Theorem 3 Let Q be a bilinear group generator. The hash function Hacfs described above 
is an asymmetric (m, n, d, y, 8) -programmable hash function withn = 1, d = 2, y = 0 and 
8 = 1 / T.
Proof First, we describe the trapdoor algorithms:
H.TrapGen(1X, bgp, g1, h 1 , g2 , ft2): first, sample ai , bi — 
a random index t  — 
[t] x  [t]. Next, set A i
H.TrapEval(td, X):
Zp for all i e [t], and pick 
[T]. Parse t  = (i*, j *) e
■ =  <?1ftT  , Bj* = g2h j  ,
Ai = h a , Vi =  i*,and Bj = h !^ , Vj  = j *. Finally, 
set td =  ( t , {ai, bi }t=1), pek =  {Ai, Bi }t=1, and 
output (td , pek) .
first, compute the subset Fx Q [T] associated to 
X  e {0, 1}1, and then return the coefficients of the 
degree-2 polynomial
cx (y1, y2) =  ai (y1) • Pj (y2)
(i,j )eFx
where every ai (y1) (resp. frj (y2)) is the discrete log­
arithm of Ai (resp. B j) in base g1 (resp. g2), viewed 
as a degree-1 polynomial in the unknown y1 (resp.
y2).
Now, we show that the two trapdoor algorithms described above satisfy the four properties 
of Definition 5. First, syntax and correctness immediately follow by construction. Second, 
observe that each element Ai (resp. Bj ) in pek is a uniformly distributed group element in
Gi (resp. G2), exactly as in the output of H.Gen, hence y = 0. Third, we show that the 
algorithms allow for well distributed logarithms for the case n = 1. Let X 1 , . . . ,  X m, Z  e X  
such that Z = Xi for all i . From the m-cover-free property of F  we have that there exist an 
index r ' e Fz such that r ' e Fxt .S incer is chosen uniformly at random in [T ],wehave
that r = r ' with probability S = 1 / T . Now, assume that r ' = r = (i*, j *) e [t] x  [t]. Then
for all (i, j ) =  (i*, j *) it holds that the degree-0 coefficient of c(y1 , y2) = ai (y{)Pj (y2) 
is C0 =  0, whereas for (i *, j  *) the degree-0 coefficient of c* (y1 , y2) =  ai * (y{)Pj * (y2) = 
(ai*y1 +  1)(bj*y2 + 1), is c* =  1. Therefore, we have that cxt,0 =  0, Vi e [m] and cz ,0 =  1 
holds with probability S. □
3.3 An asym m etric program m able hash function with small dom ain
In this section, we present the construction of an asymmetric hash function, Hsqrt, whose 
domain is of polynomial size T . Hsqrt has a public key of length O ( \ fT ), and it turns out 
to be very important for obtaining our linearly-homomorphic signature scheme with short 
public key presented in Sect. 4. Somewhat interestingly, we show that this new function Hsqrt 
satisfies several programmability properties, that make it useful in the context of various 
security proofs.
Let G(1X) be a bilinear group generator, let T = poly(X) and t = | \ f f "|. The hash function 
Hsqrt =  (H.Gen, H.PriEval, H.PubEval) that maps Hsqrt : X  ^  G 1 with X  = [T] is 
defined as follows.
H.Gen(1A, bgp):
H.PriEval(sek, X):
H.PubEval(pek, X):
for i = 1 to t , sample a i, Pi •<— Zp and compute Ai = gif1, Bi = 
g[2 . Finally, set sek  =  {ai ,Pi }t=1, pek =  {A i , Bi }i=1, and 
return(sek, pek).
first, write X  e [T] as a pair of integer (i, j ) e [t] x  [t], and then 
return
Y = ga Pj e G1
let X  = (i, j ). The public evaluation algorithm returns 
T =  e(Ai , B j ) = e(H(X), g2)
Programmable pseudorandomness of Hsqrt Here we show that Hsqrt satisfies the pro­
grammable pseudorandomness property of Definition 6.
Theorem 4 Let G1 be a bilinear group o f order p over which the XDDH assumption 
is r'-hard. Then the asymmetric hash function Hsqrt described above satisfies (2, 0,e)- 
programmable pseudorandomness with r = T  • f . Furthermore, in the case when h 1 = 
1 e G1 or h 1 = g 1, Hsqrt has (1, 0, r)-programmable pseudorandomness.
Proof First, we describe the trapdoor algorithms:
H .TrapG en(1\ g1, h 1 , g2 , h2):
H.TrapEval(td, X):
Zp for all i e [t] andfirst, sample ai , ri , si , bi
then set A i = hr1 g ^ , Bi = hs^  gb . Finally, set td =  
({ai, ri, s i, bi }ti=1), pek =  {A i, Bi }t=1, and output 
(td , pek) .
let X  = (i, j ), and then return the coefficients of the 
degree-2 polynomial
cx (y1, y2) =  (ym  + ai ) y  sj + b j)
First, it is easy to see that the two algorithms satisfy the syntax and correctness properties. 
Also, in the case hx =  1 (i.e., yx =  0) or hx =  gx (i.e., yx =  1), we obtain a degree-1 
polynomial cx  (y2). Second, observe that each element Ai (resp. Bj) in pek is a uniformly 
distributed group element in Gx (resp. G2), as in H.Gen, hence y  =  0. Third, we show that 
the function satisfies the pseudorandomness property under the assumption that XDDH holds 
in Gx. The main observation is that for every X  = (i, j ), we have cx,o = ajbj where all 
the values bj are uniformly distributed and information-theoretically hidden to an adversary 
who only sees pek. In particular, this holds even if hx =  1.
To prove the pseudorandomness we make use of Lemma 2 below, which shows that for a 
uniformly random choice of a, b —— Zp, c —— Zpxt the distributions g , g ^ 7) e Gtxx (+x) 
and (ga, g‘C) e G<[x(t+x) are computationally indistinguishable.
Lemma 2 Let a, b — Zp, c —  Zpxt be chosen uniformly at random. I f  the XDDH assump­
tion is e '-hard in Gx, then for any PPT B it holds | Pr[B(ga, ga bT) =  1 ] -  Pr[B(ga, gc) =
1]| < t  • e .
We first show how to use Lemma 2 to prove that Hsqrt has programmable pseudorandom­
ness. The proof of Lemma 2 appears slightly below.
Let A  be an adversary that breaks the e-programmable pseudorandomness of Hsqrt. We
construct a simulator B that can distinguish the two distributions (ga, ga bT) and (ga, g<[) 
described above with advantage greater than e .
B ’s input is a tuple (A', C) e G^ x Gt1Kt and its goal is to decide about the distribution 
of C . First, B runs A(bgp) which outputs the generators hx, h2. B then samples two random 
vectors r, j  —— Zp, computes B =  gij  e G2, A =  h\ • A ' e G j, sets pek =  (A, B), and runs 
A(pek) Next, for every oracle query (i, j ) made by A, B simulates the answer by returning 
to A: H (i, j ) = A and Ci, j . It is easy to see that if C = ga bT then B is perfectly simulating 
Exp^jHq^, otherwise, if C is random and independent, then B is simulating E x p ^ H ^ . As 
a final note, we observe that the above proof works even in the case hx =  1. □
Proof (Proof o f Lemma 2) To prove the above lemma, we define T + 1 hybrid distributions 
as follows. Let a, b — Zp and c — Z p '1 be randomly chosen. For every 0 < k < T  we 
define the matrix M k  e G1xt by specifying the value M k [i, j  ] of each entry (i, j ) e [t ] x  [t ] 
of the matrix. For every k ' e [T], let (i, j ) e [t] x  [t] be such that k' =  j  + (i — 1)t. Then:
-  If k' < k , Mk[i,  j ] = g 1 1,
-  If k' > k , Mk[i,  j] = ga1ibj.
Notice that M 0 =  g abT while M T = g ‘[ . Moreover,
| Pr[B(ga, Mo) = 1] — Pr[B(ga, M t ) = 1]|
T
< J 2  l Pr[B(ga, M k —x) =  1] — Pr[B(ga, M k ) = 1]|
k=1
< T • |Pr[B(ga, M k —x) = 1] — Pr[B(ga, M k ) = 1]|
We complete the proof of Lemma 2 by showing the following claim:
Claim 1 For every 1 < k < T, if  XDDH is e '-hard in Gx, then
| Pr[B(ga, M k —x =  1] — Pr[B(ga, M k ) = 1]| < e '
Assume by contradiction that | P r [ B g , M k—i = 1] — Pr[B(g^, M k) =  1]| > e '.Thenit 
is possible to build a simulator B' which breaks the XDDH assumption in Gi with advantage 
greater than e' . B  gets an XDDH instance (g1, g*, gQ, gy) and proceeds as follows:
$-  It samples c i , . . . ,  ck—i — Zp.
$
-  It samples a i , . . . ,  a?—i, aj+i , . . . , a t , b i , . . . ,  b j—i, bj+i, .. . , b t — Z p , where (i, j )  
correspond to k, i.e., k = j  + (i — i ) t .
-  It implicitly sets a =  ( a i , . . . , a ^ —i,a,a~+v . . . a t) and b =  ( b i , . . . , b j —V f ,
b;+v . . . bt).
-  B' builds a matrix M  e G ixt where:
-  If k' < k — i, M[i,  j ] = g i j ,
-  If k' = k, M[i ,  j ] = gy ,
-  If k ' > k, M[i ,  j ] = g l  j . Notice that such value can be efficiently computed by
a b j q
B' as it knows g^ =  g ^ , g ij =  gQ, , Vi = i , b j , V j  = j , and k' > k implies
(i, j )  = (i, j ) .
-  B' runs b' — B(g^, M )  and returns the same bit b '.
As one can check, if y = aQ, then M ' is distributed as M k—i. Otherwise, if y  is random 
and independent, M ' is distributed as M k . Therefore,
| Pr[B'(gi, ga, gQ, g f )  = i] — Pr[B' (gi, g*, gQ, gi,) = i]|
=  | Pr[B(ga, M k—i) = i] — P r [ B g , M k) = i]| > e '
□
(poly, 0, 2)-programmability of Hsqrt Below we show that Hsqrt is (poly, 0, 2, y, S)- 
programmable for y =  0 and S =  i. While such (poly, 0)-programmability might look 
uninteresting at first, this property turns out to be useful in various security proofs, as shown 
in our application to homomorphic signatures of Sect. 4.
Theorem 5 The asymmetric hash function Hsqrt described above is (poly, 0, d , y, S)- 
programmable with d = 2, y = 0 and S = i. Furthermore, in the case when either hi = gi 
or h2 =  g2, Hsqrt is (poly, 0, d, y, S)-programmable with d = i, y = 0 and S = i.
Proof The trapdoor algorithms are defined as follows:
H.TrapGen(iA, gi, hi, g2 , hf): first, sample r\, s\ — Zp for all i e [t] and then set
Ai = hri , Bi = hs2 . Finally, set td =  ({ri, si}‘=i ), 
pek =  {Ai, Bi}i=i , and output (td, pek).
H.TrapEval(td, X ): let X  = (i, j ), and then return the coefficients of the
degree-2 polynomial
cx (yi, y2) =  (yi y2 )nsj
Syntax and correctness are easily seen by inspection. The public key generatedby H.TrapGen 
is distributed identically to the one generated by H. G en, from which y = 0. Also, it is clear 
that for any X  e X , the degree-0 term of the polynomial cx  computed by H.TrapEval is 
always 0. It is straightforward to see that in the case yi =  i (or y2 =  i) the function satisfies 
the programmability with d = i. □
Weak (poly, 1, 2)-programmability of Hsqrt Here we prove that Hsqrt is weakly 
(poly, 1, 2, y , 8)-programmable for y = 0 and 8 = 1.
Theorem 6 The asymmetric hash function Hsqrt described above is weakly (poly, 1, d , y, 8)- 
programmable with d = 2, y = 0 and 8 = 1.
Proof The trapdoor algorithms are defined as follows:
H.TrapGen(1A, g1, h 1, g2, h2, Z ): let Z = (i*, j *) e [t] x [t]. First, sample r\, si —— Zp
for all i e [t]. Next, compute Af* = g \h1*, B j* =
g2ht2 *, Ai = fir{ , Vi = i * and Bj = h^', V j  = j  *.
Finally, set td =  ( {p, si}f=1), pek =  {Ai, Bi}f=1,and 
output (td, pek).
H. TrapEval (td, X ): given X  = (i, j ), return the coefficients of the degree-
2 polynomial
cx (y1, y2) =  ai (y 1) ■ f j  (y2)
where ai (y1) (resp. f j  (y2)) is the discrete logarithm 
of Ai (resp. B j ) in base g1 (resp. g2), viewed as a 
degree-1 polynomial in the unknown y1 (resp. y2).
Syntax and correctness are easily seen by inspection. The public key generatedby H.TrapGen 
is distributed identically to the one generated by H. G en, from which y = 0. Also, it is clear
from the construction that for Z = (i *, j  *) we have cz  (y1, y2) =  (y1r1 +  1)(y2sj + 1), and
thus cz ,0 = 1, whereas for every X  = Z  the degree-0 term of the polynomial cz  (y1, y2) 
computed by H.TrapEval is always 0. And this holds with probability 8 = 1. □
Weak (poly, 1, 2)-degree-2-programmability of Hsqrt Finally, we prove that Hsqrt is 
also weakly (poly, 1, 2, y, 8)-degree-2-programmable for y = 0 and 8 = 1.
Theorem 7 The asymmetric hash function Hsqrt described above is weakly (poly, 1, d , y, 8)- 
degree-2 programmable with d = 2, y = 0 and 8 = 1.
Proof The proof of this theorem can be seen as the “dual” version of the one of Theorem 6. 
Instead of setting the simulated keys so that Z  is the only input for which cz,0 = 1, here the 
keys are simulated in such a way that Z  is the only input in which the term y1 y2 appears. 
More precisely, the trapdoor algorithms work as follows:
H.TrapGen(1A, g1, h 1, g2, h2, Z ): let Z = (i*, j *) e [t] x  [t]. First, sample ri, si «—
Z p for all i e [t ] and then set Ai * = h 1 g1*, Bj * = 
h2g2J*, Ai = gr{ , Vi = i* and Bj = g2 , V j = j *. 
Finally, set td =  ({ri, si }t=1), pek =  {Ai, Bi }'=1,and 
output (td , pek).
H.TrapEval (td, X ): let X  = (i, j ), and then return the coefficients of the
degree-2 polynomial
cx (y1, y2) =  ai (y 1) ■ f  j (y2)
where ai (y1) (resp. f j  (y2)) is the discrete logarithm 
of Ai (resp. Bj ) in base g1 (resp. g2), viewed as a 
degree-1 polynomial in the unknown y1 (resp. y2).
Syntax and correctness are easily seen by inspection. The public key generatedby H.TrapGen 
is distributed identically to the one generatedby H.Gen, from which y = 0. By construction, 
we have that for Z = (i*, j *), c z (yi, y2) =  (ri +  yi)(sj  +  y2), and thus c z ,2 =  1, whereas 
for every X  = Z  the polynomial cx  (y i, y2) has degree < 1, and thus cx ,2 = 0. This property 
holds with probability S = 1. □
4 Linearly-homomorphic signatures with short public keys
In this section, we show a new linearly-homomorphic signature scheme that uses APHFs in 
a generic way. By instantiating the APHFs with our construction Hsqrt given in Sect. 3, we 
obtain the first linearly-homomorphic signature scheme that is secure in the standard model, 
and whose public key has a size that is sub-linear in both the dataset size and the dimension of 
the signed vectors. Precisely, if the signature scheme supports datasets of maximal size N  and 
can sign vectors of dimension T , then the public key of our scheme is of size O (s/N  +  \ /T ). 
All previously existing constructions in the standard model achieved only public keys of 
length O (N  + T ). Furthermore, our scheme is adaptive secure and achieves the interesting 
property of efficient verification that allows to use the scheme for verifiable delegation of 
computation in the preprocessing model [20].
Before describing our scheme, in the next section we recall the definition of homomorphic 
signatures.
4.1 H om om orphic signatures for m ulti-labeled program s
In this section we recall the definition of homomorphic signatures as presented in [20]. This 
definition extends the one by Freeman in [22] in order to work with the general notion of 
multi-labeled programs [6,25].
Multi-labeled programs A labeled program P  is a tuple (f , T i , . . . ,  Tn) such that f  : 
M n ^  M  is a function of n variables (e.g., a circuit) and Ti e {0, 1}* is a label of the i-th 
input of f . Labeled programs can be composed as follows: given P i , . . . , P t and a function 
g : M t ^  M ,  the composed program P * is the one obtained by evaluating g on the outputs 
of P i , . . . , P t , and it is denoted as P  * = g(Pi , . . . ,  P t). The labeled inputs of P  * are all the 
distinct labeled inputs of P i , . . . P t (all the inputs with the same label are grouped together 
and considered as a unique input of P *).
Let fid : M  ^  M  be the identity function and t  e {0, i}* be any label. We refer to 
I T = (fid, t ) as the identity program with label t . Note that a program P  = (f , T i , . . . , T n) 
can be expressed as the composition of n identity programs P  = f  ( ITi , . . . , l T n  ).
A multi-labeled program P a is a pair (P , A) in which P  = (f , T i , . . . , T n) is a labeled 
program while A e {0, i}* is a data set identifier. Multi-labeled programs can be composed 
within the same data set in the most natural way: given (P i, A ) , . . . ,  (Pt , A)  which has the 
same data set identifier A, and given a function g : M t ^  M ,  the composed multi-labeled 
program PA is the pair (P*, A)  where P * is the composed program g(Pi, . . . ,  Pt), and A  
is the common data set identifier for all the Pi . As for labeled programs, one can define the 
notion of a multi-labeled identity program as I ( a ,t ) = ((fid, t ), A).
Definition 8 (Homomorphic signatures) A homomorphic signature scheme HSig consists of 
a tuple of PPT algorithms (KeyGen, Sign, Ver, Eval) satisfying the following four proper­
ties: authentication correctness, evaluation correctness, succinctness and security. The four 
algorithms work as follows:
KeyGen(1X, L)
Sign(sk, A , t , m) 
Ver(vk, V a , m ,a )
Eval(vk, f , a )
the key generation algorithm takes as input a security parameter X, 
the description of the label space L  (which fixes the maximum data 
set size N ), and outputs a public key vk and a secret key sk. The 
public key vk defines implicitly a message space M  and a set F  of 
admissible functions.
the signing algorithm takes as input a secret key sk, a data set identifier 
A, a label t  e L  a message m e M , and it outputs a signature a . 
the verification algorithm takes as input a public key vk, a multi­
labeled program P a =  ((f ,  T1 , . . . , t„ ), A)  with f  e F , a message 
m e M ,  and a signature a . It outputs either 0 (reject) or 1 (accept). 
the evaluation algorithm takes as input a public vk, a function f  e F  
and a tuple of signatures {ai }”= 1 (assuming that f  takes n inputs). It 
outputs a new signature a .
Below we describe the four properties mentioned above:
Authentication correctness Intuitively, a homomorphic signature scheme has authen­
tication correctness if the signature generated by Sign(sk,A, t , m) verify correctly for 
m as the output of the identity program Xa ,t . More formally, the scheme HSig satis­
fies the authentication correctness property if for a given label space L, all key pairs 
(sk, vk) — KeyGen(1X, L), any label t e L, data identifier A e {0, 1}*, and any signature 
a —  Sign(sk, A , t , m), Ver (vk, I a t , m, a)  outputs 1 with all but negligible probability.
Evaluation correctness Intuitively, this property says that running the evaluation algorithm 
on signatures ( a \ , . . . , a n) such that each ai verifies for mi as the output of a multi-labeled 
program (Pi, A),  produces a signature a  which verifies for f  (m\ , . . . ,  mt) as the output 
of the composed program (f  (V\, . . . ,  Pn), A).  More formally, fix a key pair (vk, sk) — 
KeyGen(1X, L), a function g : M l ^  M ,  and any set of program/message/signature 
triples {(Pi, mi , ai )}(=j such that Ver (vk, Pi , mi , ai) = 1. If m * = g ( m \ , . . . ,  mt), P* = 
g ( P i , . . . ,  P t), and a  * =  Eval(vk, g, (ax, . . . ,  at)), then Ver (vk, P  *, m*, a*) = 1 holds 
with all but negligible probability.
Succintness A homomorphic signature scheme is said to be succint if, for a fixed security 
parameter X, the size of signatures depends at most logarithmically on the data set size N .
Security To define the security notion of homomorphic signatures we define the following 
experiment HomUF-CMA^,HomSign(X) between an adversary A  and a challenger C:
Key generation 
Signing queries
Forgery
C runs (vk, sk) — KeyGen(1X, L) and gives vk to A.
A  can adaptively submit queries of the form (A, t , m), where A  is a 
data set identifier, t  e L, and m e M .  The challenger C proceeds as 
follows: if (A, t , m ) is the first query with the data set identifier A, 
the challenger initializes an empty list Ta = 0 for A. If Ta does not 
already contain a tuple ( t , ■) (which means that A  never asked for a 
query (A , t , ■)), the challenger C computes a —  Sign(sk, A , t , m), 
returns a  to A  and updates the list Ta — Ta U ( t , m). If ( t , m) e 
Ta (which means that the adversary had already queried the tuple 
(A, t , m)), then C replies with the same signature generated before. 
If Ta contains a tuple ( t , m') for some message m' = m, then the 
challenger ignores the query.
At the end A  outputs a tuple (P**, m*,a*).
The experiment HomUF-CMA^,HomSign(X) outputs 1 if the tuple returned by A  is a 
forgery, and 0 otherwise.
To define what is a forgery in such a game we recall the notion of well defined program 
with respect to a list Ta [20].
Definition 9 A labeled program P  * =  (f  * , t*, . . . , t*) is well defined with respect to Ta* 
if one of the two following cases holds:
-  3 mi, . . mn s.t. (t *, mi) e Ta* Vi =  1, . . . ,  n.
-  3 i e {1 , . . . ,  n} s.t. (t  , ■) e Ta* and f  *({m, }(Tj ,m, )eTA* U ,-)£Ta*}) does not
change for all possible choices of m j e M .
Intuitively, the first case says that the challenger has generated signatures for the entire 
input space of f  for the data set A*, while the second one means that the inputs that were 
not signed during the experiment do not contribute to the result of f .
Using this notion, it is then possible to define the three different types of forgeries that 
can occur in the experiment HomUF-CMA:
Type 1: Ver (vk, PA*, m*,a*) = land thelist Ta * was not initialized during the game (i.e., 
no message was ever signed w.r.t. data set identifier A*).
Type 2: Ver (vk, PA*, m*,a*) = 1, P* is well defined with respect to Ta * and m* = 
f  *({mj}(Tj,m,)eTA*) (i.e., m* is not the correct output of P * when executed over 
previously signed messages).
Type3: Ver (vk, PA*, m*,a*) = 1 and P* is not well defined with respect to Ta * .
Then we say that HSig is a secure homomorphic signature if for any PPT adversary A,  we 
have that Pr[HomUF-CMA^,H0mSign(^) =  1 ]<  c(L) where e(X) is a negligible function.
We recall that, as proved by Freeman in [22], in a linearly-homomorphic signature scheme 
any adversary who outputs a Type 3 forgery can be converted into one that outputs a Type 2 
one.
Proposition 1 ([22]) Let HSig be a linearly homomorphic signature scheme with message 
space M  C R n for some ring R . I f  HSig is secure against Type 2 forgeries, then HSig is 
secure against Type 3 forgeries.
Homomorphic signatures with efficient verification We recall the notion of homomor­
phic signatures with efficient verification introduced in [20]. The property states that the 
verification algorithm can be split in two phases: an offline phase where, given the verifica­
tion key vk and a labeled program P , one precomputes a concise key vkp  ;an online phase in 
which vkp can be used to verify signatures w.r.t. P  and any dataset A . To achieve (amortized) 
efficiency, the idea is that vkp can be reused an unbounded number of times, and the online 
verification is cheaper than running P . Below is the formal definition.
Definition 10 Let HSig =  (KeyGen, Sign, Ver, Eval) be a homomorphic signature 
scheme for multi-labeled programs. HSig satisfies efficient verification if there exist two 
additional algorithms (VerPrep, EffVer) such that:
VerPrep(vk, P ): on input the verification key vk and a labeled program P  =
(f ,T 1 , . . . , T n), this algorithm generates a concise verification 
key v k p . We stress that this verification key does not depend 
on any data set identifier A .
EffVer(vkp, A, m,a) :  given a verification key vkp , a data set identifier A, a message
m e M  and a signature a , the efficient verification algorithm 
outputs 0 (reject) or 1 (accept).
The above algorithms are required to satisfy the following two properties:
Correctness Let (sk, vk) —— KeyGen(1k) be honestly generated keys, and (V a , m , a )  be 
any program/message/signature tuple with V a = (V, A)  such that Ver(vk, V a , m, a) = 1.
$Then, for every vkp  —  VerPrep(vk, V ), EffVer(vkp, A,  m , a )  = 1 holds with all but 
negligible probability.
Amortized efficiency Let V a = (V , A) be a program, let (m 1, . . . ,  mn) e M n be any 
vector of inputs, and let t (n) be the time required to compute V(m  1, . . . ,  mn). If vkp — 
VerPrep(vk, V ), then the time required for EffVer(vkp, A , m , t ) is t' = o(t (n)).
Context-hiding secure homomorphic signatures We recall and formalize the notion of 
context-hiding homomorphic signature. Intuitively, it states that a signature which certifies m 
as the output of a multi-labeled program Va = ((f , T 1 , . . . , T n), A)  does not reveal anything 
about the underlying data beyond the result of the computation. We give a simulation-based 
notion of security, requiring that a signature a  can be simulated given knowledge of only the 
labeled program V a , its output m and the secret key sk, but without Va ’s input. The simulated 
signature is required to be indistinguishable from one obtained by running the Eval algorithm 
to any distinguisher D that is also given a key pair (sk, vk), the label program V a and the 
signatures on the messages on which the program V a is evaluated. Essentially, this property 
says that a verifier, even with the knowledge of the secret key, cannot gain any information 
beyond what can be trivially inferred from the input of the verification algorithm.
Definition 11 An homomorphic signature scheme for multi-labeled programs supports 
context hiding if there exist additional PPT procedures a —  Hide(vk, m , a )  and 
HVerify(vk, V A, m, a)  such that:
• Correctness: For any (vk, sk) — KeyGen(1k, L) and any tuple (V a , m , a) such that 
Ver (vk, V a , m, a) = 1, we have that if a —  Hide(vk, m , a) then HVerify(vk, Va , m ,
a ) =  1.
• Unforgeability: The signature scheme is secure when we replace the original verification 
algorithm Ver with HVerify in the security game.
• Context-Hiding Security: There is a simulator Sim such that, for any fixed (worst-case) 
choiceof (sk, vk) e KeyGen(1k, L), any labeled program V A = ( f, t1, . . . ,  ti, A) and 
messages m 1 , . . . ,  mi,  there exists a function e(k) such that for any distinguisher D it 
holds
| Pr[D ( I , Hide(vk, m , a)) = 1 ] -  Pr[D ( I , Sim(sk, V A, m) = 1] |=  e(k)
where I  = (sk, vk, V A, {mi, a; = Sign(sk,A, t  , mi )}f=1), m = f  (m 1, . . . , m l ), 
a  —Eval(vk,a1, . . . , a i ) ,  and the probabilities are taken over the randomness of 
Sign, Hide and Sim. If e(X) is negligible then the scheme is said to have statistical 
context-hiding, otherwise, if e (k) = 0, the scheme has perfect context-hiding.
Remark 2 (On the hiding algorithms) We would like to remark that the Hide procedure is 
introduced to aim for generality of the above definition. However an explicit Hide procedure 
may not be necessary, i.e., there may be schemes where the evaluation algorithm already 
produces context-hiding signatures. In these cases, the above definition still applies as the 
Hide procedure can be simply the identity function, and HVerify can be the regular verification
algorithm Ver.
Remark 3 (Relation with existing definitions) As a second remark, we note that context­
hiding security for homomorphic signatures has been considered in earlier works [2, 11,26]
with (slightly) different definitions. Compared to the weakly context-hiding notion of Boneh 
and Freeman [11], ours is stronger in that it considers indistinguishability even when one 
knows the original signatures. The notion of Ahn et al. [2] is made for P -homomorphic 
signatures, where P are predicates. Although P -homomorphic signatures and the homomor­
phic signatures considered in this work are equivalent (cf. [26, footnote 1]), with respect to 
context-hiding our notion is slightly weaker as it requires context-hiding to be satisfied with 
the help of specific hiding algorithms. However, it is not hard to see that when a scheme 
satisfies context-hiding with trivial hiding algorithms (i.e., Hide is the identity function and 
HVerify =  Ver), then it also satisfies the notion of [2]. Our definition above is inspired by 
that of [26] except for two main differences. First, in our case the simulator is explicitly given 
the circuit for which the signature is supposed to verify. This is in contrast to the definition 
in [26] where the simulator receives a value a output of a P rocess procedure, which can be 
seen as the equivalent of our VerPrep algorithm. With respect to this difference our definition 
is more general, and we stress that the circuit is not hidden in either of the two context-hiding 
notions. Second, our definition considers indistinguishability in the presence of the original 
signatures o i. Although including this information may not be necessary for schemes with 
a “powerful” hiding procedure, it allows for more generality. Finally, let us note that a dis­
advantage of using hiding algorithms is that after the application of Hide signatures may no 
longer be used in further homomorphic computation.
4.2 O u r construction
Let £ '  =  (KeyGen', Sign', Ver') be a regular signature scheme, and F  : K  x{0,  1}* ^  
Zp be a pseudorandom function with key space K. Our linearly-homomorphic signature 
scheme signs T -dimensional vectors of messages in Zp , supports datasets of size N , with 
both N  =  poly(X) and T  =  poly(X) and is context-hiding secure. Let H =  (H.Gen, 
H.PriEval, H.PubEval) and H' =  (H.Gen', H.PriEval', H.PubEval' ) be two asymmetric 
programmable hash functions such that H : [N] ^  Gx and H' : [T] ^  Gx.
We construct a homomorphic signature HSig =  (KeyGen, Sign, Ver, Eval) as follows:
KeyGen(1X, L, T ). Let X be the security parameter, L  be a set of admissible labels where 
L  =  {1 , . . . ,  N }, and T  be an integer representing the dimension of the 
vectors to be signed. The key generation algorithm works as follows.
-  Generate a key pair (vk', sk') —— KeyGen'(1X) for the regular scheme.
-  Run bgp —— G(1X) to generate the bilinear groups parameters bgp =  (p,  G1, G2, Gt , 
g1, g2 , e) where G1, G2 and Gt are groups of prime order p  ~  2X, g 1 e G1, g2 e G2 
are generators and e : G1 x G2 ^  Gt is an efficiently computable, non-degenerate 
bilinear map.
-  Choose two random seeds K , K  —— K  for the PRF F : K  x{0,  1}* ^  Zp .
-  Run (sek, pek) —— H.Gen(1X, bgp) and (sek', pek') —— H.Gen'(1X, bgp) to generate 
the keys of the asymmetric hash functions.
-  Return vk =  (vk', bgp, pek, pek') and sk =  (sk', K , K , sek, sek').
Sign(sk, A, t , m). The signing algorithm takes as input the secret key sk, a data set identifier 
A  e {0, 1}*,alabel t e [N ] and a message vector m e Zp ,andproceeds 
as follows:
1. Derive the integer z — Fk (A) using the PRF, and compute Z  =  g2.
2. Compute o a — Sign'(sk', A |Z ) to bind Z  to the dataset identifier A.
3. Derive r — Fg (A | t), set R = and compute
S =
T
H.PriEval(sek, t ) ■ R ■ ^ [  H.PriEval/(sek/, j ) mj
j =1
1/z
4. Return a signature a = (o a , Z , R, S).
Essentially, the algorithm consists of two main steps. First, it uses the PRF Fk to derive 
a common parameter z which is related to the data set A, and it signs the public part, 
Z = g2, of this parameter using the signature scheme S '. Then it uses the same PRF
Fg with a different seed K  to create the pseudorandom element R = g p ^ 4 ^ . Second, 
it uses z to create the homomorphic component S of the signature, such that S is now 
related to all (A, t , m).
Eval(vk, f ,  a ). The public evaluation algorithm takes as input the public key vk, a
linear function f  : Zp ^  Zp described by its vector of coefficients 
f =  (f 1 , . . ., fa), and a vector a  of t  signatures a 1 , . . . , a £  where 
ai = (aA,i, Z i , Ri , Si) for i = 1 , . . . , t .  Eval returns a signature 
a = (o a , Z , R, S) that is obtained by setting Z = Z 1, oa = oa , 1, 
and by computing
r = n Rfi > s = n Sfi
i = 1 i =1
Ver(vk, P a , m, a).  Let P a = ((f ,  T1 , . . . ,  t ), A)  be a multi-labeled program such that 
f  : Zp ^  Zp is a linear function described by coefficients f =  
(f 1 , . . . ,  f t) .L e tm  € Zp be a message-vector and a = (o a , Z , R , S) 
be a signature.
First, run Ver/(vk/, A |Z , oa) to check that oa is a valid signature 
for Z  and the dataset identifier A  taken as input by the verification 
algorithm. If oa is not valid, stop and return 0 (reject).
Otherwise, output 1 if and only if the following equation is satisfied
e(S, Z ) H.PubEval(pek, ■ e(R, g2) ■
x
T
]""[ H .PubEval'(pek', j ) mj
j =1
(1)
Finally, we describe the algorithms for efficient verification:
VerPrep(vk, P ). Let P  =  (J , T 1 , . . . , t i ) be a labeled program for a linear
function f  : Zp ^  Zp . The algorithm computes H  =
Y]f= 1 H.PubEval(pek, t ) f i , and returns the concise verification 
key v kp  = (vk', bgp, H, pek').
EffVer(vkp, A , m , a ) .  The online verification is the same as Ver except that in the verifica­
tion equation the value H  has been already computed in the off-line 
phase (and is included in vkp ).
Clearly, running the combination of VerPrep and EffVer gives the same result as running 
Ver, and EffVer’s running time is independent off  ’s complexity t.
We formally show the correctness of our homomorphic signature scheme in Sect. 4.3. The 
following theorems state the security and context-hiding of our scheme. Their proofs appear 
in Sects. 4.4 and 4.5 respectively.
Theorem 8 (Unforgeability of HSig) Assume that S ' is an unforgeable signature scheme, 
F is a pseudorandom function, and G is a bilinear group generator such that: H has 
(1, y , e)-programmablepseudorandomness; H' is weakly (poly, 1, 2, y ' , S')-programmable 
and (poly, 0, 1, y ' , S')-programmable; the 2-DHI and the FDHI assumptions hold. Then 
HSig is a secure linearly-homomorphic signature scheme.
We note that our scheme HSig can be instantiated by instantiating both H and H' with 
two different instances of our programmable hash Hsqrt described in Sect. 3.3. As one can 
check in Sect. 3.3, Hsqrt allows for the multiple programmability modes required in our 
Theorem 8. Let us stress that requiring the same function to have multiple programmability 
modes is not contradictory, as such modes do not have to hold simultaneously. It simply means 
that for the same function there exist different pairs of trapdoor algorithms each satisfying 
programmability with different parameters.5
Theorem 9 (Context-hiding of HSig) Assume that S ' is an unforgeable signature scheme, F 
isapseudorandomfunction, and H =  (H.Gen, H.PriEval, H.PubEval) and H' =  (H .Gen', 
H.PriEval', H.PubEval') be two asymmetric programmable hash functions such that H : 
[N ] ^  Gx and H' : [T ] ^  G1. I f  S ' is deterministic, then the scheme HSig satisfies perfect 
context hiding in the sense o f Definition 11.
We note that for the sake of context-hiding in our scheme there are no specific hiding algo­
rithms (i.e., one can see Hide as the identity function and HVerify as Ver). In other words 
the signing and the evaluation algorithms already produce signatures with context-hiding.
Remark 4 (Alternative requirement for context-hiding) To prove context-hiding of our 
linearly-homomorphic signature scheme, in Theorem 9 we require the scheme S ' to be 
deterministic. It is worth mentioning that alternatively we could also prove context-hiding 
by requiring S ' to be re-randomizable and by giving an explicit Hide algorithm. In a few 
words,6 a signature scheme is re-randomizable if it comes with an additional algorithm R  
that on input a message m and a signature a  outputs a new signature a  which is indistin­
guishable from a fresh signature on m. If S ' is re-randomizable, then context-hiding can be 
achieved by letting Hide work as follows: instead of simply being the identity function, Hide 
takes a signature a = (aA, Z , R , S), applies the re-randomization algorithm on aa to obtain 
another signature cta on the message (A\Z),  and outputs a  =  (aa , Z , R, S). This way the 
fresh signature aA created by the simulator will be indistinguishable from the one a a in the 
output of Hide.
4.3 Proof of correctness
Theorem 10 I f  S ' is a correct signature scheme, and H, H' are asymmetric hash functions 
for bilinear groups, then the scheme HSig satisfies the authentication correctness property.
Proof Let (sk, vk) be a pair of honestly generated keys and let a —  Sign(sk, A , t , m) 
be a honestly generated signature, with a = (aA, Z , Rt , St ). In order to prove that the
5 We also stress that, by definition, the outputs of these trapdoor algorithms are statistically indistinguishable.
6 A formal definition of re-randomizable signatures can be found in [1].
verification algorithm Ver(vk, I ( a ,t ) , m, o ) outputs 1 with all but negligible probability, the 
first observation to do is that by the correctness of S ' the signature oa verifies correctly for 
Z  and A. Then, by construction of HSig, we can see that
H.PriEval(sek, t) • Rt • ^ [  H.PriEval/(sek/, j ) mj
j =1
T
mj
Hence, we have that
(  T \  1/z
e(ST, Z) = e I H.PriEval(sek, t ) • Rt • H.PriEval'(sek', j ) mj I , Z
j =1
mj
= e (H.PriEval(sek, t ), gf) • e(Rt , g2) • e H.PriEval'(sek', j ) mj, g2
e
T
mj
T
= H.PubEval(pek, t) • e(Rt , g2) • ^~[ H.PubEval/(pek/, j ) mj
j =1
mj
where the last equation holds by definition of H.PubEval and H.PubEvaK.
Theorem 11 I f  S ' is a correct signature scheme, and H, H; are asymmetric hash functions 
for bilinear groups, then the scheme HSig satisfies the evaluation correctness property.
Proof Let (sk, vk) be a pair of honestly generated keys, and let {m(>\  Vi,A,Oi = 
(o a , Z , Ri , Si )}f= 1 be messages, labeled programs and signatures such that Ver (vk, V i,a , 
m (>'), oi) = 1, for all i = 1 to I. Let a  •<— Eval(vk, f ,  a  = (01, . . . ,  off) be a a sig­
nature obtained by running Eval on signatures (o1 , . . . , oi), where 0 = (o a , Z , R, S). 
By construction of Eval, we have R = nf=1 Ri'  and S = nf=1 Sf . So, if we let 
m =  f  (m(1), . . . ,  m (I)) =  Ya =1 fi • m (if, for evaluation correctness we want to prove 
that the verification algorithm Ver (vk, P a , m, o ) outputs 1.
The fact that oa verifies correctly for Z  and A  is immediate by correctness of S ' and by 
construction of Eval (which simply copies one of these honestly-generated signatures). 
Since each oi verifies correctly, for every i = 1 , . . . , I  we have
(i)
e(Si , Z) = H.PubEval(pek, t i) • e(Ri , g2) • H .PubEval'(pek', j ) mjm
j =1
Then, by the previous equations and the fact that H, H  are asymmetric hash functions for 
bilinear groups, we obtain the desired equation:
e(S, Z) = e
/ 1/z
I H.PriEval(sek, T)fi  ■ R f  ■ H.PriEval^sek', j ) fim<j> I , Z
i =1 j =1 /
i =1
i
=  ( ]~[ H.PubEval(pek, T)f i J ■ e(R, g2) ■ I H.PubEval/(pek/, j ) ^ = ‘ fimj
= H.PubEval(pek, t ) fi ■ e(R, g2) ■ l^~[ H.PubEval'(pek', j ) m
e
T
T
4.4 Proof of security
To prove Theorem 8, we show that for every PPT adversary A  running in the security 
experiment HomUF-CMA^ HSig, the probability that the experiment outputs 1 is negligible. 
We do the proof by describing a series of hybrid games. We write Gi (A) to denote the event 
that a run of Game i with adversary A  returns 1. Some of the games use some flag values 
badi that are initially set to false. If at the end of a game any of these values is set to true, 
the game simply outputs 0. We call Badi the event that badi is set to true during the run of 
an experiment. Essentially, whenever an event Badi occurs in Game i , the game may deviate 
its outcome.
Finally, we note that in the following proof we directly use the result of Proposition 1 
so that we only have to deal with Type-1 and Type-2 forgeries, since Type-3 ones can be 
converted in Type-2.
Game 0 This game is the security experiment HomUF-CMA^ HSig (where A  only outputs 
Type-1 or Type-2 forgeries).
Game 1 This game is defined as Game 0 apart from the fact that whenever A  returns a 
forgery a  * = (a A, Z  *, R*, S*) such that Z * was not generated by the challenger in 
the signing query phase, then Game 1 sets badx ^ t r u e .  As we show in Lemma 3, 
any noticeable difference between Game 0 and Game 1 can be reduced to producing 
a forgery for the regular signature scheme S '. Furthermore, it is worth noting that 
after this change, the game never outputs 1 if the adversary returns a Type-1 forgery.
Game 2 This game is defined as Game 1 except that the pseudorandomfunction F  is replaced 
by a random function R  : {0, 1}* ^  Zp . It is easy to see that Game 1 is compu­
tationally indistinguishable from Game 2 under the assumption that PRF.KG is 
pseudorandom.
Game 3 is defined as Game 2 except for the following change. Let (P**, a*, m*) be the 
forgery returned by the adversary where P** =  (f *, L*), a * = (a*, Z *, R*, S*) 
and A * = A  for some p, e [ Q ] where Q is the number of distinct datasets 
asked by A  during the game (note that such p  must exist at this point since the 
adversary can win only with a Type-2 forgery). The challenger computes S = 
Te_c* (St) , R = TeL* (Rt) m =  Te£* f*  ■ m T where {Rt , St }t are
the signature components generated by the challenger in all the signing queries 
(Ap , t , m T). If the forgery verifies correctly, i.e., Ver(vk, PA*, m*, a*) = 1, and 
m* = m and S* = S, then the challenger sets bad3^ t r u e .  It is easy to see that 
Pr[G2(A)] — Pr[G3(A)] < Pr[Bad3]. In Lemma 5 we show that any adversary for 
which Bad3 occurs can be reduced to a solver for the 1-DHI problem.
Game 4 This game proceeds as Game 3 except for the following change: at the beginning, 
the challenger chooses a random index p  — [Q], where Q =  poly(X) is the 
number of signing queries made by A  during the game. Let A 1 , . . . , A q be all 
the datasets queried by A. Then if the dataset A* used by A  in the forgery is not 
A p , the challenger sets bad4 —true. As one can check, we have that Pr[G3 (A)] =  
Q • Pr[G4(A)].
Game 5 proceeds as Game 4 except that at the end the challenger runs the following addi­
tional check: if Ver(vk, P**, m*, a *) =  1 and m* =  m and S* = S and R* = R , 
then the challenger sets bads —true. It is easy to see that Pr[G4 (A )]-P r[G  5(A)] < 
Pr[Bad5]. In Lemma 7 we show that any adversary for which Bads occurs can be 
reduced to a solver for the 2-DHI problem.
Game 6 proceeds as Game 5 with the following modification. At the very beginning, the
$
challenger chooses the value zp — Zp that will be used to generate the signa­
tures for p-th dataset A p . It sets Zp = g f f . Second, instead of generating the
key pek of the hash function H using H.Gen, the challenger runs (td, pek) — 
H.TrapGen(1X, bgp, gi, gi, g2, Z p) where H.TrapGen is the algorithm for which 
H has (1, y , e)-programmable pseudorandomness. Then the challenger uses td 
when it needs to compute HQ during the experiment.
If H hash (1 ,y , A)-programmable pseudorandomness we immediately obtain 
that Game 5 and Game 6 are within statistical distance y , i.e., | Pr[G5(A)] — 
Pr[G6(A)]| < y .
Game 7 This game is the same as Game 6, except that in the signing queries ( A , t , m) 
such that A  is the p-th distinct dataset queried by A, the challenger first computes 
cT —H.TrapEval(td, t ) and then generates the signature component Rt by setting 
Rt =  g— Ct’0, instead of choosing Rt — G1 randomly as done up to Game 6.
As we show in Lemma 8, Game 6 is computationally indistinguishable from Game 7 
under the assumption that H has programmable pseudorandomness. Moreover, note 
that due to the previous modifications, Game 7 can output 1 only if the adversary 
outputs a forgery (P** , a *, m*) such that Ver (vk, P**, m*,a*) =  1 and m* =  m 
and S* =  S and R* =  R . We conclude the proof by showing in Lemma 9 that an 
adversary that wins in Game 7 can be used to solve the FDHI problem (Definition 4).
We proceed with the proof by formally bounding the difference between each consecutive 
pair of games, and eventually the probability that an adversary wins in the last game. The 
proof of Theorem 8 is finally obtained by putting together all the bounds.
Lemma 3 For every PPT A  there exists a PPTforger Fsuch that Pr[Go (A)] —Pr[G 1(A)] <
AdvU™  (x).
Proof The two games differ only if Bad1 occurs in Game 1,i.e., | Pr[G0(A)] —Pr[G1(A)]| < 
Pr[B adJ. However, by the construction of HSig, if Bad1 occurs, it means that the forgery 
returned by A  includes a valid signature aa* on (A*|Z *) although no signature on (A*|-) 
was ever returned by the challenger during the experiment. It is straightforward to show that, 
for any such a PPT A, there exists a PPT forger algorithm F  that breaks the unforgeability 
of the regular signature scheme E ', i.e., Pr[Bad1] <
Lemma 4 For every PPT A  there exists a PPT distinguisher D such that | Pr[G 1(A)] — 
Pr[G2(A)] |<  AdvPFRD(X).
Proof Game 1 and Game 2 differ just for the fact that the PRF F  is replaced by a random 
function R. It is easy to do a reduction to the security of the PRF to show that for any adversary 
A  such that | Pr[G 1(A)] — Pr[G2(A)]| > e is non-negligible it is possible to construct a PPT 
distinguisher D that archives advantage e against the pseudorandomness of F . □
Lemma 5 I f  H is simply (1, y)-programmable, and H' isweakly (poly, 1, 2, y ' , S')-degree-2 
programmable, then for every PPT A  running in Game 3 there exists a PPT simulator B such 
that Pr[Bad3] < ( T / f  ) • Advl-DHI(X) +  y + y '.
Proof Assume there exists a PPT adversary A  such that Pr[Bad3] > e . Then we show how 
to build a PPT simulator B that breaks the 1-DHI assumption with advantage greater than 
( f e ) / T  — y — y '. 2
B takes as input a tuple (g1, g2 , g{, g2), and its goal is to compute g1 . Precisely, here we 
use the fact that this problem is equivalent to the 1-DHI problem in which the adversary has 
to compute g f  . So, B proceeds as follows.
Setup: B starts by sampling a random y —-  Zp and runs (td, pek) —-
H.TrapGen(1A, bgp, g1, g1, g2, g | ). Note that since B had set h1 =  g1, 
the polynomials cx  generated by H.TrapEval(td, X ) will be univariate
polynomials cx(y).  Next, it chooses a random index v —-  [T], which 
represents a guess on the index where the message vector m* returned 
by the adversary in the forgery will differ from the “correct” result m . 
Then B sets h1 =  g \ , h2 = g2 and runs the trapdoor generation (for 
weakly degree-2 programmability) of the asymmetric hash function H' 
-  (td', pek') —— H'.TrapGen(1A, bgp, g1, h 1, g2, h2, v) -  by providing 
v as the input on which the coefficient cv,2 =  0. Indeed, notice that by 
giving h1 =  g l , h2 =  g2 to H'.TrapGen, the polynomials generated 
H'.TrapEval(td', X ) will be univariate polynomials cx (z).
Finally, the simulator generates the keys (sk', vk') of the scheme S ', sets 
vk =  (vk', pek, pek'), stores sk ', td, td', and returns vk to A.
Signing queries: Let k — 1 be a counter for the number of datasets queried by A. For 
every new queried dataset A, B creates a list Ta of tuples ( t , m, a),  
which collects all the label/message pairs queried by the adversary on A, 
and the respectively generated signatures. Moreover, whenever the k -th
$
new dataset Ak is queried, B samples a random %k — Zp , computes 
Zk =  (g2) k and stores %k. Note that all the values {Zk}ke[g] are random 
in G2 and thus are distributed exactly as in Game 3.
Given a signing query ( A , t , m) such that A  =  Ak is the k -th 
dataset, B proceeds as follows. First, it runs cT —H.TrapEval(td, t), and 
cj —H'.TrapEval(td', j ) for all j  =  1 to T . If cj 2 =  0 then B continues
the simulation as follows, otherwise it aborts.$
Therefore, B samples a random pT — Zp and computes
R t =  g1
c r (y) — E  j  = 1 c j,0 mJ
(g1 ) PT, S r Pt Ig l  • g 1 j
,1 c j,\mJ
(g 1z)z ,2n
?k
Forgery:
As one can see, the value RT is a uniformly distributed Gi element as in 
Game 3. Moreover, ST is a correctly distributed signature since
St = (V ■ ^  ■ (gi)CV2m'
= ( sCtW ■g-
= ^H(r) ■ Rt ■ gi
j = 1
1
r = ( •
ZPt g j=1 zcj,1mj )CV 2mv= ■ g1
■cT(y)-Y. T,=1 c’Iflm
' ■(gZ P  ■gP T=1 cj0”
Y.'T=1(C,J'0+Cj' lZ+cj,2z2)mJ Zk 1
T \ i  t
o  cj (z)mi ' ■ g/  1 = | H(r) ■ Rr
T 1 icj, 1mj I2
■g1 j j ' ■(g! )
j=1
T
m
SFinally, B returns to A  the signature a = (a*, Zk, RT , ST), where a* — 
Sign(sk' , * |Z k ).
Let (V**, a*, m*) be the forgery returned by the adversary. B proceeds 
exactly as the challenger in Game 3 in order to compute R , S , rn. If Bad3 
occurs, since (V**, a* , m*) verifies correctly the following two equations 
hold
T
e(S*\ Z „) = A ■ e(R*, g2) ■ ["[ H.PubEval'(pek', j ) m**,
j =1
T
e(S' Z ^  = A ■ e (R' g2) ■ H .PubEval'(pek'' j ) mj
j =1
where A = ]”[ te c* H.PubEval(pek, t ) t . If we divide the two equations 
and consider that, by definition of Bad3, it holds S* = S , then we obtain
R* =n h ' (j  )mj =1
By correctness of the trapdoor algorithms of H' we know that H'( j ) =
c’. +c' z+c' z2
g1j  j  j  where cj  ^ = 0 for all j  = v (since B did not abort so
far). If c'v 2 =  0 then B aborts, otherwise it continues as follows. How­
ever, notice that by the weak (poly , 1, 2 , y ' , S') programmability of H' 
the event that cj  ^ = 0 for all j  = v and c'v  ^ = 0 holds with probability 
S'. Therefore, B does not abort with probability S'. Furthermore, since the 
simulation provided to A  until its forgery’s output is distributed statisti­
cally close to the real execution of Game 3 (close by a factor y + y ' due 
to the use of TrapGen in H and H'), v is information-theoretically hidden 
to A . Hence,
R _  Yj=1(c'j , 0+cj11 z+cjaz2)(m*-thj)
R* = g1
E T=1(cj , 0+cj'1 Z)(m* —hj )+cv 2 z2 (m*—hv)
Since m* =  rn there must exist an index v' e [T] such that m* =  m v . 
If v' =  v then B aborts, otherwise it computes
g f  =
R - gi
— E^Ccj^+cj^lKm* -mj ) \  c'v,2
R*
2
It is easy to see that if B does not abort, B is able to compute the solution g l of the 
l-DHI problem. The probability that B does not abort is S' ■ Pr[v; =  v] =  S' / T  since v is 
uniformly distributed and completely hidden from the view of A. In conclusion, we have that 
if Pr[Bad3] > e then B has advantage at least (S'e)/T  — y  — y '. □
Lemma 6 Pr[G3 (A)] =  Q ■ Pr[G4(A)]
Proof First, note that Pr[G4(A)] =  Pr[G4(A) A Bad4] +  Pr[G4(A) A —Bad4] =  
Pr[G4(A) |—Bad4] Pr[—Bad4] since Game 4 outputs 0 whenever Bad4 occurs. Second, 
observe that when Bad4 does not occur (i.e., the challenger guesses correctly the query 
index p  of the dataset A *) then the outcome of Game 4 is identical to the one of Game 3, i.e., 
Pr[G4(A)|—Bad4] =  Pr[G3(A)]. Since p  is chosen uniformly at random and is completely 
hidden to A  we have that Pr[—Bad4] =  1 /Q, from which the lemma follows. □
Lemma 7 I f  H is simply (1, y)-programmable, and H' is weakly (poly, 1, 2,y ' ,S ' )-  
programmable, then for every PPT A  running in Game 5 there exists a PPT simulator B 
such that Pr[Bad5] < (T/S') ■ A d v ^ DHI (k) +  y  +  y '.
Proof Assume there exists a PPT adversary A  such that Pr[Bad5] > e . Then we show how 
to build a PPT simulator B that breaks the 2-DHI assumption in Gi with advantage greater 
than (S'e)/T  — y  — y '.
B takes as input a tuple (g i, g2 , g l , g2, gl , g2 ), and its goal is to compute g ^  
B proceeds as follows.
. To do so
Setup: B proceeds as the challenger in Game 5 by choosing a random index
p  [Q]. Second, B picks a random y ^  Zp and runs (td, pek) ^
H.TrapGen(1k, bgp, gi, gi, g2, g2). Note that since B had set hi =  gi, 
the polynomials cx generated by H.TrapEval(td, X ) will be univari­
ate, degree-i, polynomials c x (y). Next, it chooses a random index 
$v •<— [T], which represents a guess on the index where the message 
vector m* returned by the adversary in the forgery will differ from the 
“correct” result rn. It runs the trapdoor generation (for weak (poly, i, 2)- 
programmability) of the asymmetric hash function H' -  (td', pek') — 
H '.TrapGen(ik, bgp, gi, g i , g2 , g2, v) -  providing v as the input on 
which the coefficient cv,o =  0. Notice that by giving hi =  g \ , h2 =  g2 
to H'.TrapGen, the polynomials generated H/.TrapEval(td/, X ) will be 
univariate polynomials cx (z) =  cx,o +  cx,iz +  cx,2z2.
Finally, it generates the keys (sk', vk') of the scheme S ', sets vk =  
(vk', pek, pek'), stores sk', td, td ', and returns vk to A.
Signing queries: Let k — i be a counter for the number of datasets queried by A. For every 
new queried dataset A, B creates a list Ta of tuples (t , m, a),  which 
collects all the label/message pairs queried by the adversary on A  and 
the respectively generated signatures. Moreover, whenever the k -th new
dataset Ak is queried, B does the following: if k = p  it samples a random 
f  —  Z p , computes Zp = (gffi  and stores f ; if k =  p,  B samples directly
a random Zk —— Zp , computes Zk = g2k and stores Zk. Note that all the 
values {Zk}kpQ] are random in G2 and thus are distributed exactly as in 
Game 5.
Given a signing query (A, t , m) such that A = Ak is the k -th dataset, B 
first computes OAk —  Sign(sk/, A k , Zk), and then proceeds as follows.
- I f  k = p,  B runs cT —H.TrapEval(td,T), and cj —H/.TrapEval(td/, j )
for all j  = 1 to T  .I t  samples Rt —— G i, and computes
zk
St = I g ^  • Rt j l gij
T
C (z)
In particular, note that every g1 j can be computed by B using the values
z z2 g i , g i .
-  If k = p,  B runs cT —H.TrapEval(td, t), and cj —H/.TrapEval(td/, j )
for all j  = 1 to T  . I f  cj 0 =  0 for all j  = v , then B continues the
simulation as follows, otherwise it aborts.$
Therefore, B samples a random pT — Zp and computes
Rt = gi
CT(y)-Cv, 0 mv
(gi)PT, St = [ g f  • gi
As one can see, the value Rt is a uniformly distributed Gi element as in 
Game 5. Moreover, St is a correctly distributed signature since
Pt Tj = 1 ( c ' j ,1 +c 'j,2z ) m j  f  , „ r ,
S t  =  g 'l • g1 ‘  j  j  =  g f  ‘ • g1ZPt ^ = 1 (cj , 1 Z+Cj , 2 z 2 ) m A ZF
CT(y) - CT(y')- C'v,0mv ZPt Yz = 1 (.c' j ,0 +zc' j ,1 +c'j,2z2)mj  Z
= gl • g1 • g{ • g1 j ’ ’ ’ '
=  ^H(r) • Rt • g j + Zj  + j  z2)j Z
/ J _
ZP
= I H(t) • Rt • H'(j )m
j =1
Finally, B returns to A  the signature a = (oAk, Zk, R t , St ).
Forgery: Let (PA*, a* , m*) be the forgery returned by the adversary. B proceeds exactly 
as the challenger in Game 5 in order to compute R , S , rn. If Bads occurs, since 
(P**, a*, m* ) verifies correctly the following two equations hold
T
e(S*, Zp) = A • e(R*, g2) • f [  H.PubEval/(pek/, j ) m*,
j =1
e(S, Zp) = A  ■ e(R , g2) ■ f [  H.PubEval'(pek', j ) mj
j =1
where A  =  J~[Tec* H.PubEval(pek, t ) t . If we divide the two equations and 
consider that by definition of Bad3, S* =  S but R* =  R we obtain
S*
1
zl
=  m  h ' (j )
j =1
c' ' +c' z2
Byusingthe H' .TrapEval algorithm we know that H '(j) =  g1h h h where
cj 0 =  0 for all j  = v (since B did not abort so far). If c'v 0 =  0, then B aborts, 
otherwise it continues as follows. Nevertheless, notice that by weak (poly , 1, 2)- 
programmability of H', cj 0 =  0 for all j  = v , whereas c'v 0 =  0 holds with 
probability S', which means that with probability at least S' B does not abort. 
Hence,
S* (  1/ ( z t) \^ j  = 1(C'j,0+ZC'j, 1+C'j,2z2)(mj
=  g1
-ni:)
1/(z|)\ c'v,0(m*—hv) E j=1(c'j, 1 +cj,2z)(m*-rhj)/l
(g !M ) ) g1
Since m* =  m there must exist an index v' e [T] such that m*, = miv. If v' = v 
then B aborts, otherwise it computes
g1/Z =  ( ^
Y,j=1 1+C j  +Cj,2 —mj
T
Note that the simulation of Game 5 provided by B to A  is statistically close (by a factor 
Y +  y ’ due to the use of TrapGen in H and H') to the real execution of Game 5. Then, it is easy 
to see that if B does not abort, it is able to compute the solution of the 2-DHI problem g1 . 
The probability that B does not abort is S' ■ Pr[v' =  v] =  S'/  T  since v is uniformly distributed 
and completely hidden from the view of A. In conclusion, we have that if Pr[Bad5] > e then 
B has advantage at least (S 'e)/T  — y  — Y '. □
Lemma 8 I f  the asymmetric hash function H has (1, y , e)-programmable pseudorandom­
ness then | Pr[G6(A)] — Pr[G7(A)]| < e.
Proof We do the proof by contradiction. Assume there exists a PPT adversary A  such that 
| Pr[G 1] — Pr[G2]| > e. Then we show how to build a PPT simulator B that breaks the 
programmable pseudorandomness of H with advantage e . We build such a simulator B as 
follows:
Setup: B first receives the bilinear group parameters bgp, which includes
the two generators g1, g2. B proceeds as the challenger in Game 6
$ $by choosing a random index p  —-  [Q] and a random zp —-  Zp . It 
also prepares Zp =  g2p . Then it sets h1 =  g1 e G i, h2 =  Z p and
returns (h1, hf) to its challenger. It receives back a public key pek 
for H, and also gets access to an oracle that on input t outputs H(t) 
and either g ^ ’0 or g[T.
B then queries its oracle on all inputs t e [N  ] and stores all the 
answers {Yt , Ct}te[N]. Moreover, B chooses in advance the values
Zk —— Zp , Wk e [Q] \  {/x|,  and stores {zk, Zk = }• Next, it gener­
ates the keys (sk7, vk7) of the scheme £ ',  the keys (sek7, pek7) of the 
asymmetric hash H7, it sets vk =  (vk7, pek, pek7), stores sk7, sek 7, 
and returns vk to A.
Signing queries: Let k — 1 be a counter for the number of datasets queried by A. For
every new queried dataset A , B creates a list Ta of tuples (t , m, a ), 
which collects all the label/message pairs queried by the adversary 
on A  and the respectively generated signatures.
On the k -th query (A, t , m), B proceeds as follows:
-  If k = x , B first generates the signature oa on (Ak, Zk) using 
the secret key sk7. Next, it chooses a random value Rt —— Gi and 
computes St = (Yt ■ Rt n^T=1 H.PriEval7(sek7, j ) mj)l/zk.
-  If k = x ,  B works exactly as above except that it sets Rt =  C- 1 .
Finally, B returns to A  thesignature a = (o a , Zk, Rt , ST),whereaA —— Sign(sk7, A|Zk).
Forgery: Let (PA*, a* , m*) be the forgery returned by the adversary. B proceeds exactly as 
the challenger in Game 7 in order to determine the outcome of the experiment, and 
outputs 0 or 1 accordingly.
It is easy to see that if B receives from its oracle values Ct with the pseudorandom 
distribution, then B is perfectly simulating Game 7 to A. Otherwise, if the values Ct are 
random then B is simulating Game 6. Therefore,
| Pr[Exp£R f-° =  1 ] -  P rtE xp^R f-1 =  1]| =  | Pr[G7(A)] -  Pr[G6(A)]| =  e
□
To conclude the proof, we are left with showing that any PPT adversary has negligible 
probability of winning in Game 7. We show this in the following lemma where we prove 
that this holds under the Flexible Diffie-Hellman Inversion Assumption (FDHI) given in 
Definition 4 .
Lemma 9 I f  H has (1, y, e)-programmablepseudorandomness and H7 is (poly, 0, 1, y ' , &')- 
programmable, then for any PPT A  running in Game 7 there is a PPT B against the FDHI 
assumption such that Pr[G7(A)] =  AdvgDHI (£)/&' +  y  +  y 7.
Proof Assume that A  is a PPT adversary such that Pr[G7(A)] =  e. Then we show how 
to build a PPT simulator B which uses A  to solve the FDHI problem with advantage e. B
z r
receives an FDHI instance (g1, g2 , gz , gV, g\ , g [, g\ ) and works as follows.
Setup: B proceeds as the challenger in Game 6 by choosing a random
$index x  ■<— [Q]. Next, it runs the trapdoor generation algo­
rithm for the programmable pseudorandomness of H, (td, pek) •<— 
H.TrapGen(1A, bgp, g1, g1, g2, g2), and the trapdoor generation
algorithm for the (poly, 0, 1)-programmability of H7, (td7, pek7) — 
H7.TrapG en(1\ bgp, g1, g1, g2, g2).
Finally, it generates the keys (sk7, vk7) of the scheme £ 7, sets 
vk =  (vk7, pek, pek7), stores sk7, td, td7, and returns vk to A.
Signing queries: Let k — l be a counter for the number of datasets queried by A. For 
every new queried dataset A , B creates a list Ta of tuples (t , m, a ), 
which collects all the label/message pairs queried by the adversary 
on A  and the respectively generated signatures.
Moreover whenever the k -th new dataset Ak is queried, B does the
$following: if k = yi it samples a random ^  —  Zp , computes Z /x =
(gz2)& and stores Z^, ^  if k = n , B samples a random %k —  Zp , 
and computes Zk = (g2f)%k and stores Zk, %k. Note that all the values 
{Zk}ke[Q] are random in G2 and thus are distributed exactly as in 
Game 7.
Given a signing query (A, t , m) such that A = Ak is thek-th dataset, 
B first computes aAk —  Sign(sk/, A k, Zk), and then proceeds as 
follows.
- I f  k = n: B runs cT —H.TrapEval(td,T), and cj ——H'.
TrapEval(td/, j ) for all j  = l to T . Notice that by the (l, y, e)- 
programmability of H we have that cT is a degree-l polynomial 
in z: cT(z) = cT,o + cT,iz. Similarly, the polynomials cj gener­
ated by H'.TrapEval are also of degree l in the sole variable z; If 
cj 0 =  0, then B continues the simulation as follows, otherwise it 
aborts. Notice that, by (poly, 0, l)-programmability of H', the event 
that Vj  e [T] : cj 0 =  0, i.e., cj (z) = cj xz holds with probability at
least S'. Therefore, B does not abort with probability at least S'.
$
Next, it samples pT — Z p , computes
Rt = g - cT■ 0 • g ) Pt, St
r z t /
• (gV)PT • (gv)j  c j l
%k
and returns a = (Zk, aAk, Rt , St ) to A.
Note that the signature is correctly distributed as in Game 7, since Rt 
is a uniformly distributed G i element, and
St =  ( g ) 0"  • g ) *  • ( g p E j=‘ %k
= ( g  ^  • g  )pt • g  )e T=> c' , mj) ^
= ( g ? - 0 • g  )ctp • g - cT’0 • g  )pt • g ? =
T , o'. (z)m j zk
= (H (t) • Rt • g t j = j ' j
= ( h (t) • Rt • n  gOj (z)mj V
j =l
T
±_
zk
= I H(t) • Rt n H'(j ) n
j=1
- I f  k = n'. B runs cT^H .T rapE val(td ,r),
TrapEval(td', j ) for all j  = 1to T . Itsets RT = g - CT'0
Sr = g[c> - g ? - '
and cj H'. 
and computes
and returns a = (Zx , aA^ , RT, ST) to A.
As one can check, such signature is distributed as a signature in Game 
7: Rt = g- Cr’0 as in the definition of Game 7 (for the fx-th dataset) 
while for ST we have
ST T.U
c'j,1mj & ZCT,1 z e T=g1 j 1
)  =
g1  
•g1
ZCt,1 -CT,0 ET=f i j  z)mi
1
zxg1 T,1 g1 T,0 g1 j
c T
H ( T ) . R , . g f Cj ft)" '
_1_
Zx
H(t) • Rt n cj (z)mjg 1
j =1
_1_
Zx
T
H(t) • Rt ^]_[H /(j ) mj
±_
Zx
1
z^ x
Forgery: Let (P* *, a*, m*) be the forgery returned by the adversary. B proceeds exactly 
as the challenger in Game 7 in order to compute R , S , rn.
By definition, if Game 7 outputs 1, since (P**, a*, m*) verifies correctly, the 
following two equations hold
T
e(S*, Zx) = A • e(R*, g2) • f ]  H.PubEval/(pek/, j ) m*,
j =1
T
e(S, Z^) = A • e(R , g2) • f f  H.PubEval'(pek', j ) m>
j =1
where A = ]”[Te£* H.PubEval(pek, t ) t . If we divide the two equations and 
consider that by definition of Game 7, it must be S* = S and R* = R , then we 
obtain:
S*
S
1
(R * r  c'j,1 z(m*j~mi )g1
±_
1
z^ x
(2)
Therefore B can compute
R*
W = , W ' =
R
S* Ej =i  j -m*j)
T )  g i
and returns (W, W') as a solution for the FDHI assumption.
To see that (W, W') is a solution for the FDHI assumption, i.e., W' = W l/z, 
observe that by Eq. (2) it holds
(W ')z =
S* Ej=1 zcj'1(m j —m*)
j )  • "1
( ! ) 4
gcj,1(mj -n,j)
1
Tj=1 zcj,1(m j -m*j)
Note that the simulation of Game 7 provided by B to A  is statistically close (by a 
factor y  + y ' due to the use of TrapGen in H and HO to the real execution of Game 
7. Then, it is easy to see that if Game 7 outputs 1, B is able to compute the solution 
of the FDHI problem, as described above. In conclusion, if Pr[G7(A)] > e then 
B has advantage at least (S'e) — y — y ' in solving FDHI.
□
Finally, we note that when instantiated with our APHF Hsqrt from Sect. 3.3, the programma­
bility properties stated in the theorem hold with probability S' = 1 while the property of 
statistically-close trapdoor keys holds in a perfect sense, i.e., y = 0 and y ' = 0.
4.5 Context-hiding security
In this section, we prove the context-hiding security of our linearly homomorphic signature 
scheme.
Proof (Theorem 9) First notice that since in our case there is no hiding procedure (i.e., one 
can see Hide as the identity function and HVerify as Ver), correctness and unforgeability 
follow trivially.
In order to prove context-hiding security, we construct below a simulator and then show 
that its signatures are perfectly indistinguishable from the ones obtained through a run of the 
Eval algorithm.
Simulator Sim(sk, V a , m). Parse the simulator’s input as sk =  (sk;, K , K , sek, sek O , 
PA = ((f1, f i ) ,T 1 , . . . , T i ,A )  and m =  (m 1 , . . . ,  m t ). With this information, the
simulator computes the following values:
-  {Ri = gPRF KGi^ (4 ^d j£=1 where [ri }^=1 are the labels in V a .
-  [Hti =: H .PriEval(sek,ri)}f= 1 and [Hj =: H.PriEval/(sek/, j )}^=1.
-  Z = g2, where z PRF.KGk (A).
-  aA ^  Sign/(sk/,A |Z ).
-  r  = nf=1 R f i .
t T
-  s  = I n f ‘ R ■ f t ’’ j  .
The simulator finally outputs a signature a 1 =  (aa , Z , R, S).
Indistinguishability o f signatures Here we show that our simulator allows for context hid­
ing security. Fix any choice of (sk, vk) e KeyGen(lA, L), P a = ((f t , f t ) ,  t i , . . . ,T £ ,A ) ,  
and m t , m t  e M T . For all i = t to t ,  we have ai = Sign(sk, A , t , m i) with 
ai = (aA,i, Z i, R i, Si), and notice that since the scheme E ' is deterministic fixing 
sk', A , Tt, m t , . . . ,T t ,  m t fixes also all the signatures a t , . . . , a t .
Let a 0—E v a l(v k ,a t ,.. . ,  at) and recall that by construction the signature a 0 =  
(a'A , Z R ' , S') consists of:
-  Z ' =  Zt =  g2, where z —  PRF.KG^(A).
-  a A =  a a ,t — Sign'(sk', A |Z).
-  R' = n t=t Rf , where R = g^ and ri —  PRF.KG^^ (A | Ti).
-  S' =  n t= t  S f .
Let us now assume that we have a distinguisher D which is given I  = (sk, vk, P a , m t, 
a t , . . . ,  m t, at) and either one of a 0 — Eval(vk, f ,  {ai }t=t) or a 1 — Sim(s£, P a , m).
In what follows we show that a 0 and a 1 are distributed identically, that is any D has 
advantage 0 in distinguishing the two cases. To prove this, we are going to compare the two 
signatures a 0, a 1 element by element.
0 .1a~ a
a A = a a ,t | aA —  Sign'(sk', A| Z)
Since the scheme E ' is deterministic and by construction of a a ,t (see above), one can see 
that a a and a '  are equal.
Z ! = Zt = g2, where z — Fk (A ) | Z = g \ , where z — Fk (A )
The two elements are clearly equal because of the PRF (z is uniquely determined given 
K , A ).
R' =  n t=t Rifi r  =  n  t=t Rfi
By the construction of the simulator the elements {Ri }t_ t are the same on both sides since 
in both cases are generated deterministically using the PRF F  with seed K . This implies 
R = R'.
(  t T \  1/1
S = 1 f  r  ■ ff ; ' J
We claim that S' = S. To see this, let us recall how each Si is defined: by the signing algorithm
m t / z
we have Si = yUTi ■ Ri ■ f[^= t f j
S' =  n t= t  S f
. Therefore
t/z t/z
= n  ( ■R f  n f(Jfmij I =  m  ■ r  n f ?
D  = 1 f ij i,j S
i=t j =t U =t j=t
T
S
t
where the last equality follows from the fact that m =: ^"^ fi m i.
i =0
5 Short signatures with shorter public keys from bilinear maps
In this section we describe how to use APHFs to construct in a generic fashion standard-model 
signature schemes over bilinear groups. We propose two constructions that are provably- 
secure under the q -Strong Diffie-Hellman [10] and the q -Diffie-Hellman [9] assumptions. 
These constructions are the analogues of the schemes in [30,32] respectively. The basic idea 
behind the constructions is to replace a standard (m, 1)-PHF with an (m, 1, d )-APHF. In fact, 
in this context, having a secretly-computable H does not raise any issue when using H in the 
signing procedure as the signer already uses a secret key. At the same time, for verification 
purposes, computing the (public) isomorphic copy of H in the target group is also sufficient. 
Our proof confirms that the (m, 1, d )-programmability can still be used to control the size of 
the randomness in the same way as in [30,32]. One difference in the security proof is that the 
schemes in [30,32] are based on the q-(S)DH assumption, where q is the number of signing 
queries made by the adversary, whereas ours have to rely on the (q + d — 1)-(S)DH problem. 
Since our instantiations use d =  2, the difference (when considering concrete security) is 
very minor.
When plugging into these generic constructions our new APHF, Hacfs, described in 
Sect. 3.2, which is (m, 1, 2)-programmable, we obtain schemes that, for signing -Obits mes­
sages, allow for public keys of length O (m \[t) as in [39].
We describe the scheme based on q-SDH in Sect. 5.1, and the one based on q -DH in 
Sect. 5.2. As discussed in [32], the advantage of the scheme from q-DH compared to the one 
from q -SDH is to be based on a weaker assumption.
5.1 A q -strong Diffie-Hellm an based solution
In this section we revisit the q -SDH based solution of [30]. The signature £qSDH =  
(KeyGen, Sign, Ver) is as follows:
KeyGen(1X). Let X be the security parameter, and let -  = -(X) and p = p(X) be arbitrary 
polynomials. Our scheme can sign messages in {0, 1}- using randomness in 
{0, 1}p. The key generation algorithm works as follows:
-  Run bgp —— G(1X) to generate the bilinear groups parameters bgp =  (p, Gx, G2, Gt , 
g1 , g2 , e) where G1, G2 and Gt are asymmetric groups of prime order p  ~  2X, g1 e G1, 
g2 e G2 are generators and e : G1 x G2 ^  Gt is an efficiently computable, non­
degenerate bilinear map.
-  Run (sek, pek) —— H.Gen(1X, bgp) to generate the keys of the asymmetric hash func­
tion.
-  Choose a random x — Z p and set X  — g^ . Return vk =  (bgp, pek, X ) and sk =  
(sek, x ).
Sign (sk, M ). The signing algorithm takes as input the secret key sk, and a message
M e {0, 1}- . It starts by generating a random r —— {0, 1}p. Next, it 
computes a = H.PriEval(sek, M ) ~  and outputs (a, r ).
Ver (vk, M , (a, r)). To check that (a, r) is a valid signature, check that r is of length p and 
that
e(a, X  ■ g2) = H.PubEval(pek, M)
We state the security of the scheme in the following theorem (whose proof appears in the full 
version). We note that for simplicity our proof assumes an (m, 1, d )-APHF for d = 2, which
matches our realization. A generalization of the theorem for a generic d can be immediately 
obtained, in which case one would rely on the (q + d — 1)-SDH assumption.
Theorem 12 Assume that G is a bilinear group generator such that the (q + 1)-SDH assump­
tion holds in G1 and H is (m, 1, 2, y, 5)-programmable, then £qSDH is a secure signature 
scheme. More precisely, let B be an efficient (probabilistic) algorithm that runs in time t, asks 
(up to) q signing queries and produces a valid forgery with probability e, then there exists 
an equally efficient algorithm A  that confutes the (q + 1)-SDH assumption with probability
e > e — Y — q p
5 qm+1\
2pm
Proof This proof is almost identical to the corresponding one from [30], we rewrite it here 
mainly to show how to use APHFs in place of standard PHFs.
Let B be an adversary against the signature scheme. Assuming that B asks (up to) q 
signing queries, and denote with Mi the i-th queried message and with (oi, ri) the corre­
sponding signature. Also, let M *, (o*, r *) be the produced forgery. We distinguish two types 
of forgeries:
Type I forgery: It holds that r * =  ri for some i e [q ].
Type II forgery: It holds that r* =  ri Vi e [q].
Notice that these two cases are mutually exclusive and completely cover the set of possible 
forgeries. Now we show that both types of forgeries can be used to violate the (q + 1)-SDH 
assumption.
Lemma 10 (Type I forgeries) Let B be a type I forger that breaks the signature scheme with 
advantage e1 (and making up to q signature queries). Then there exists an (equally efficient) 
adversary A  that breaks the (q + 1)-SDH assumption with advantage e', where
e > e1 — Y — q p
5 qm+1\
2pm
We prove the lemma via a sequence of games. We denote with Gi the event that Game i 
outputs 1, i.e., that B (successfully) forges in Game i .
Game 0 This game is the standard existential unforgeability experiment ExpUF-CMA. 
Clearly,
P r[G 0 ]= e1
Game 1 This is the same as the previous game but the parameter of the APHF are generated 
using H.TrapGen (rather than H.Gen). More precisely, A  runs H.TrapGen(1A, g1, 
h 1 , g2 , hfi), where g1, g2 are, randomly chosen, generators and h1 =  g f, h2 = g%
$for a randomly chosen a —  Z p .By the y -closeness of the trapdoor keys, we have:
Pr[G1 ]> P r[G  0] — Y
Game 2 In this game we do the following changes. First, we choose the r i’s used to answer 
signing queries all in advance (rather than one by one when needed). Since the ri ’s are 
chosen at random and independently anyway this change cannot affect B’s advantage at all. 
Second, we modify the way g1, h\, g2, h2 are chosen when executing H.TrapGen. 
Specifically, let g1 be a generator of G1 and g2 be a generator of G2. We choose i* gr
{ 1 , . . . ,q }  and we set r* = ri*, R = uq=1ri , R* = R \{r*}
and R *’’ =  R \  {r*, r,}. Next, we define the polynomials p*(z) =  ]”[reR* (z +  
r) mod p  and p(z) = p*(z)(z + r *) mod p. Notice that both polynomials are of 
degree < q . Thus, from g i , g i , g?£q it is possible to compute g 1 = gp (x) and 
h 1 = gp x ). Next we set g2 =  g2, X  = g% and h2 = g2  +r ) . The distribution of 
g i , g2 is identical to the one in Game 1. The only difference might occur in the case 
p (x ) =  0, as in this case gi, hi would not be generators. By the Schwartz-Zippel 
lemma [37,40], however, this happens only with probability at most q / p. Thus
Pr[G2] > Pr[Gi] -  q
p
Game 3 Let Bad3 be the event that the same r, is used to sign more than m different messages.
This means that if Bad3 occurs there are, at least, m + 1 indices i i , . . . ,  im+i such 
that rii =  . . .  =  rim+i. Onq signing queries there might be up to (m+i) < qm+i such 
tuples. Moreover, a given tuple is of the form rq =  . . .  =  rim+i with probability 
2p/2 p(m+r>. This means that
Pr[Bad3] < q
m+i
2pm
We modify Game 2, by letting that the simulation aborts if Bad3 occurs. Thus,
Pr[G3] > Pr[G2] q
m+i
2pm
Game 4 Let Bad4 be the event that B outputs a value r* such that r* = ri, but i = i *. We 
modify the previous game by imposing that the simulation aborts if Bad4 occurs. 
Thus,
Pr[G4] =  Pr[G4 A -B a d 4] =  ^  Pr[G3]
q
Game 5 Let Bads be the event that either there is an index i e [q ] such that ri = r * such that 
cmi ,0 =  0, or it occurs cm*,0 =  0. Game 5 proceeds as Game 4 except that it aborts 
if Bads occurs. Using the programmability of H, we can bound the probability of 
Bads. Precisely, we have that Pr[—Bads] > 8, from which we have
Pr[Gs] =  Pr[Gs A -B ads] =  8 Pr[G4]
Game 6 We further modify the simulation by using the alternative signing mechanism, from 
[i0 ]. In particular, to sign the i-th queried message M i, one proceeds as follows. 
First, compute cMi ^H .TrapEval(td, Mi). Notice that by the setting of hi, h2 and 
by the definition of TrapEval, cMt is a degree-2 polynomial cm{ (x+ r*). Let us write 
CMi (x +  r*) =  cMi ,0 +  c'm. (x +  r *), where c'm. (x +  r*) is the degree-2 polynomial 
obtained by simply removing the degree-0 term from cm, (x +  r*). Hence, one 
computes
i
ai =  H.PriEval(sek, M ,) x+ri
cm,,0+c'm. (x+r*)\ x+ri
(  „ p*(x )CMi ,0„ p*(x)cMi (x +r *A x+ri 
=  gi ! gi !
-CM i ,0 nreR*,i ( x + r U CMi (x + r * AIreR*,i (x+ r )
Moreover, for all the signing queries that do not cause Bads, notice that CMt,0 =  0 
and thus such signing queries can be answered without any explicit knowledge of 
x .A sa  consequence,
Pr[G6] =  Pr[G5]
Notice also that in Game 6, we are assuming that neither Bad5 nor Bad4 
occur. This means that, for the the forged signature (M *,a*, r*) one has that 
H.PriEval(sek, M *) =  gciM*(x+r  ^ and cM*,0 =  0. Using the same notation as 
above, using the q-SDH instance we can compute
cm i (x+r*)
y = 81
x+r*
as cm i (x +  r *) isa  polynomial of degree < 2 without the constant term, i.e, Cm i (x +  
r*) is divisible by (x +  r*). We set
a / {a* • y -1) 1/cm*,°
1 p*(x)
1
Using standard techniques [10,30], a ' can be used to extract the required <g1x+r . 
This means that Pr[G6] < e. Finally, putting together the bounds from the games 
above yields the lemma.
Lemma 11 (Type II forgeries) Let B be a type II forger that breaks the signature scheme 
with advantage e2 (and making up to q signature queries). Then there exist (equally efficient) 
adversaries A 1, that breaks the (q + 1)-SDH assumption with advantage e, and A 2 that 
breaks the discrete logarithm problem with advantage eDL, where
e +  eDL > e2 -  q / p -  Y
Again we prove the lemma via a sequence of games, and use Gi to denote the event that B 
(successfully) forges in Game i .
Game 0 This game is the standard existential unforgeability experiment ExpUF-CMA. 
Clearly,
Pr[G 0] = e_2
Game 1 This is the same as Game 1 above, (i.e. the parameter of the programmable hash 
function are generated using H.TrapGen (rather than H.Gen). Thus,
Pr[Gx] > Pr[G0 ] -  Y
Game 2 In this game we do the following changes. First, we choose the ri ’s used to answer 
signing queries all in advance (rather than one by one when needed). Second, we 
modify the way g1, h\, g2 , h2 are chosen when executing H.TrapGen. Specifically, 
let g1 be a generator of G1 and g2 be a generator of G2. We we set R = uq= j r ; . 
Next we define the (degree-q) polynomial p(z) =  n=R(z + r) mod p  . From 
g1 , <g1, . . . ,  it is possible to compute g1 =  8 \ (X ) and h1 =  g1 =  8 \ (X ). Next we
set g2 =  g2, X  = 8x , andh2 =  (for random a •<— Zp). Note that the distribution 
of g1, g2 is identical with respect to Game 1. Again, the only difference might occur 
in the case when p (x ) =  0, as in this case g1 would not be a generator. Thus
Pr[G2] > Pr[G1] -  q  
p
Game 3 Let M * be the message used in the forgery, and let cM* —H.TrapEval(td, M *). We 
define Bad3 as the event that cm * (a) = 0. Then, if Bad3 happens Game 3 aborts. It is 
not hard to show, that if Bad3 occurs, then one can break the discrete log assumption 
in the group G2 (which in turn is implied by the (q + 1)-SDH assumption). Indeed, 
cm * (a) = cm *,0 +  Cm * a is here a degree-1 polynomial in the variable a, and the 
elements g2 , g<aL are given as part of a challenge (g1, g\* , . . . ,  g ^ , g2 , g2>) of our 
(q + 1)-SDH assumption. The unknown discrete log a can be then easily computed 
as a = - cm*,0/ cm*, 1.
Pr[G3] > Pr[G2] -  eDL
Game 4 We further modify the simulation by using the alternative signing mechanism, 
from [10]. In particular, to sign the i-th message Mi one obtains CMt —H. 
TrapEval(td, M i) and then computes
1
ox =  H.PriEval(sek, M i) x+ri
_  „cMi M il re_R\{q }(x +r )
1
cMi (a) x+ri
( gt )
1p(x)CMi (a) x+ri
( gt )
Since all the signing queries, can be answered without any explicit knowledge of x 
we have that
Pr[G4] =  Pr[G3]
Notice also that since we are assuming that Bad3 does not occur we have that, from 
the produced forgery on M * we can extract
1 p(x)
a ' = {a *) 1/Cm* (a) =  g1x+ * =  g1x+*
Again, by using standard techniques [10,30], a ' can be used to extract the required
1
gx+r . Hence, Pr[G4] < e. Finally, putting together the bounds from the games 
above yields the lemma.
5.2 A q -Diffie-Hellman based solution
In this section we show how to revisit the q -DH based scheme of [32] in order to work with 
APHFs. Our construction uses a standard PHF as an additional building block. We construct 
a signature £qDH =  (KeyGen, Sign, Ver) as follows:
KeyGen(1A). Let k be the security parameter, and let £ = £(k) and p = p(k) be arbitrary 
polynomials. The scheme can sign messages in {0, 1}£ using randomness in 
{0, 1}p. The key generation algorithm works as follows:
-  Run bgp — G(1k) to generate the bilinear groups parameters bgp =  (p, G1, G2, Gt , 
g1 , g2 , e) where G1, G2 and Gt are groups of prime order p  ~  2k, g1 e G1, g2 e G2 
are generators and e : G1 x G2 ^  Gt is an efficiently computable, non-degenerate 
bilinear map.
-  Run (sek, pek) — H.Gen(1k, bgp) to generate the keys of the asymmetric hash func­
tion.
-  Let D =  (PHF.Gen, PHF.Eval) be a group hash function [30] over G2 with input length 
p such that D is programmable using the algorithms (PHF.TrapGen, PHF.TrapEval).
Run (k , t ) —  PHF.TrapGen(1k, gi, g1), for a random y —— Zp .
-  Return vk =  (bgp, pek, k) and sk =  (sek, t , y ). In what follows, we use the same 
notation of [32], and use d (r) as a shorthand for (a, b) —  PHF.TrapEval(T, r), d (r) =  
a + yb.
Sign(sk, M ). The signing algorithm takes as input the secret key sk, and a message
M  e {0, 1}^ . It starts by generating a random r e {0, 1}p. Next, it
1
computes a = H.PriEval(sek, M ) and outputs (a, r).
Ver(vk, M , (a, r)). To verify that (a, r) is a valid signature, check that r is of length p , that 
d (r) =  0 and that
e(a, PHF.Eval(r)) = H.PubEval(pek, M)
We prove the security of the scheme in the following theorem. We note that for simplicity our 
proof assumes an (m, 1, d)-APHFfor d = 2, which matches our realization. A generalization 
of the theorem for a generic d can be immediately obtained, in which case one would rely 
on the (q + d — 1)-DH assumption.
Theorem 13 Assume that G is a bilinear group generator such that the (q + 1)-DH assump­
tion holds in Gx, H is an asymmetric (m, 1, 2, y, S)-programmable hash function, D is 
a (1, poly, y ' , S' ) programmable hash function over G2 then £qDH is a secure signature 
scheme. More precisely let B be an efficient (probabilistic) algorithm that runs in time t, asks 
(up to) q signing queries and produces a valid forgery with probability £1, then there exists 
an equally efficient algorithm A  that confutes the (q + 1)-DH assumption with probability
£  > SS'
q
2pm
Proof Again the proof is almost identical to the corresponding one from [30], we rewrite it 
here for completeness. Let B be an adversary against the signature scheme. Assuming that B 
asks (up to) q signing queries we denote with Mi the i-th queried message and with (ai, ri) 
the corresponding signature. Also, let M *, (a*, r*) be the produced forgery. We distinguish 
two types of forgeries
Type I forgery : It holds that r * =  ri for some i e [q ].
Type II forgery : It holds that r* = ri Vi e [q].
Notice that these two cases are mutually exclusive and completely cover the set of possible 
forgeries. Now we show that both types of forgeries can be used to violate the (q + 1)-DH 
assumption.
Lemma 12 (Type I forgeries) Let B be a type I  forgery that breaks the signature scheme with 
advantage £1 (and making up to q signature queries). Then there exists an (equally efficient) 
adversary A  that breaks the (q + 1)-DH assumption with advantage £ , where
£  > SS'
q
2pm
Again we prove the lemma via a sequence of games, and use Gi to denote the event that B 
(successfully) forges in Game i .
Game 0 This game is the standard existential unforgeability experiment ExpUF-CMA. 
Clearly,
P r[G 0]= £1
Game 1 Let Badi be the event that the same ri is used more than m times. We change the 
simulation by forcing an abort if Bad1 occurs. As done in Lemma 10 we have that
Pr[G1] > Pr[G0] q
m+1
2pm
Game 2 In this game we do the following changes. First, we choose the ri’s used to answer 
signing queries all in advance (rather than one-by-one when needed). Since the 
ri’s are chosen randomly and independently anyway, this change cannot affect B ’s 
advantage at all. Second, we guess the index i such that i = i * and we abort if this 
does not happen (i.e. B outputs an r* =  ri). Clearly,
1
Pr[G2] > -  Pr[G1]
q
Game 3 In this game we do the following changes. First, the parameter of the asymmetric 
programmable hash function are generated using H.TrapGen (rather than H.Gen). 
Next, we modify the way g 1 , h 1 , g2 , h.2 are chosen when executing H.TrapGen. 
Specifically, let g1 be a generator of G1 and g2 be a generator of G2. Let R =  lU= 1 r i, 
R* = R \ { r *} and R*^ = R \ { r *, ri}. We set
g gOreR* d(r) h gLIreR d(r) g g h gd(r*)g1 =  1^ h 1 =  g1 g2 =  g2 h2 = g2
The y -statistical closeness of H’s trapdoor keys implies
Pr[G3] > Pr[G2] -  y
Game 4 Let Bad4 be the event that, letting c ^ ; —H.TrapEval(td, Mi), the following hap­
pens. Either CMt,0 =  0 for some i for which ri = r*, or cm*,0 =  0 (where 
cM* ^H.TrapEval(td, M *)). Game 4 proceeds as Game 3 except that it it aborts if 
Bad4 occurs. The programmability of H implies that
Pr[G4] =  Pr[G3 A -B a d 4] > 3 Pr[G3]
Game 5 Now we change the way signing queries are answered. Whenever a message Mi is 
queried, the simulator computes CMt ^H .TrapEval(td, mi) and sets
„cm (d(r*)) n reR*’i d(r)
Oi =  ^1 ! reR
Notice that it is possible to sign all the received signing queries as, by Game 4, for 
all ri =  r *, it holds CMt,0 =  0. Game 5 is perfectly indistinguishable from Game 4, 
from B’s perspective, i.e.,
Pr[Gs] =  Pr[G4]
Game 6 Now for each ri we compute (ai, bi) •<— PHF.TrapEval(t’ ri) (for the received 
forgery we would get (a*, b*)). Let Bad6 be the event that, either ai =  0 mod p 
for some i such that r * =  ri, or a* =  0. If Bad6 occurs, Game 6 aborts. By the 
(1, poly, y ' ’ 3 ) programmability of D
Pr[G6] > 3  Pr[G5]
Now we embed the received (q +  1)-DH challenge (g1’ g1, . . . ,  g y^  , g2 , g\ ) as
input, and we proceed as before (but using the fact that we do not explicitly know 
y ). It is easy to check that all signing queries can be answered. Moreover, once
the forgery (M *, a *, r*) is produced, we can extract a solution of the (q + 1)-DH 
challenge as follows. First, since by Game 4 cm*,0 =  0, we can write
z =
a  *
r.c’M* (d(r*)) rGR* (ar+ybr)
b*/cM*,0
where, cM (d(r*)) is the polynomial obtained from cm* (d(r*)) by removing the 
constant term cm*,0 and dividing by d (r*)).
z =
1
H.PriEval(sek, M *)
„c'M* (d(r*)) nreR* (ar + ybr)
b*/cM*,0
cm* ,0/d(r *)
8x ' 8 x
M*(d(r *»!! rGR (ar+ ybr)
(  cM*,0/(yb*) 
[81
(d (r*))T[rGR* (a r+ybr)
\ b*/c M*,0 1/y
= 8 1
gcM* (d(r*))/d(r*) b*/cm*'0
8cM* (d(r*)) n rgR* (ar +ybr) 
b*/cM*'0
( cM*'0/d(r*)\b*/cM*'0 
= {g 1 )
Finally, by using techniques from [ 10] one can easily get the desired result 81
1/y
Lemma 13 (Type II forgeries) Let B be a type IIforger that breaks the signature scheme with 
advantage £2 (and making up to q signature queries). Then there exists an (equally efficient) 
adversary A  that breaks the (q + 1)-DH assumption with advantage £  and an adversary 
that breaks the discrete logarithm assumption with advantage e" where
£’ +  h'e" > S'(£2 -  y)
This lemma can be proved by easily adapting the proof of Lemma 11 to this setting.
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Appendix A: Digital signatures
A digital signature scheme consists of three algorithms S  = (KeyGen, Sign, Ver) such 
that:
KeyGen(1A) the key generation takes as input a security parameter k and returns a secret 
key sk and a public verification key vk.
S ig n (sk 'm) on input a secret key sk and a message m , the signing algorithm generates a 
signature a  .
V er(vk 'm' a) given a triple vk' m ' a  the verification algorithm outputs 1 (accept) if a  is a 
valid signature on m for verification key vk, and 0 (reject) otherwise.
The security of a signature scheme, called existential unforgeability against chosen 
message attacks (UF-CMA) is defined via the following experiment:
Experiment Exp^FECMA (k)
(sk, vk) L  KeyGen(1k)
(m*,a*) L  ASign(sk,°(vk)
If Ver (vk, m*,a*) = lan d  m * = mi for all mi queried to Sign(sk, •), output 1 
Else Output 0
The advantage of A  in breaking the UF-CMA-security of E  is Adv^|r-;CMA(k) =  
Pr[Exp^F-? MA(k) =  1]. Then we say that A  (t, Q, e)-breaks the UF-CMA-security of 
E  if A  runs in time t , makes at most Q signature queries, and A d v ^ -CMA (k) = e.
A digital signature scheme E  is UF-CMA-secure if for any PPT A, AdvJ^|r-CMA(k) is 
negligible.
Appendix B: On the hardness of the FDHI assumption
To gain confidence in the FDHI assumption we show that FDHI is implied by the following 
decisional assumption:
Definition 12 (Decisional Assumption 1) Let G be a generator of asymmetric bilinear groups,
let bgp =  (p, G1, G2, Gt , g 1 , g2 , e) L  G(1k) where g1 , g2 are two random generators. The 
Decisional Assumption 1 is e-hard for G if for every PPT adversary A:
z r z r
Pr[A(g l , g2 , g2, g2,, g 1 , gr1 , g { , g2 )] -  Pr[A(g l , g2, g2, g2,, g 1 , gr1 , g 1 , g2)] | < e
where z, v, r, t Z  p .
Proposition 2 For any A  which e -breaks the FDHI assumption, there is B which e '-breaks 
Assumption 1 where e' > e — 1/p
z r
Proof (Sketch) Let (g1, g2, g2, gvV, g 1 , g \ , g 1 , T ) be the input of B where T  can be either 
1/7 z r
g2 or g2 for a random and independent t . B runs (W, Y ) L A ( g 1 , g2 , g2, gv, g 1 , g[, g1 ).
If e(Y, g2) = e(W , g2) (i.e., A  succeeds), then B returns 1 if e(W, T ) = e(Y, g2) holds, and 
0 otherwise.
Clearly, if T = g]/z , e(W, T ) = e(W, g 1/ ) = e(W 1/7, g2) = e(Y, g2). Instead, if T  is 
random and independent, the equation holds only with negligible probability 1/p. □
As a next step, we show that Assumption 1 can be equivalently re-written in the following 
Assumption 2 without rational exponents:
Definition 13 (Decisional Assumption 2) Let G be a generator of asymmetric bilinear groups,
let bgp =  (p, G1, G2, Gt , g1, g2 , e) L  G(1k). Let h1 e G1, h2 e G2 be two random
generators. The Decisional Assumption 2 is e-hard for G if for every PPT adversary A :
|Pr[A(h1, h2 , h2, h2, h1, h[u, h[x , hx22)] — Pr[A(h1, h2 , hx2 , hu2 , h \ , h[u, hrx, h2)] < e 
where x , u, r, t L  Zp.
Proof The equivalence between the assumptions is obtained by setting the following equal­
ities:
gt =  hu, g2 = h2, =  h2, gv = h2, g1/v = h 1 , =  h™ g 'r  = h r ,  T = Tr/v
Finally, it is not hard to see that Assumption 2 is hard in the generic bilinear group model. 
When framing the assumption according to the master theorem in [13], the polynomial x 2 
(in the group G2) is in fact linearly-independent from the other polynomials representing the 
instance of the assumption. To confirm the validity of Assumption 2, we also automatically 
tested it using the generic group tool of [7].7
Appendix C: Programmable hash functions [30,31]
Let G be a cyclic group and X e N be a security parameter. A group hash function H  with 
inputlengthl  = l(X) isdefinedby acoupleofPPT algorithms H  = (PHF.Gen, PHF.Eval). 
Given the security parameter X, PHF.Gen outputs a key K  —— PHF.Gen(1X) which is used 
for deterministically evaluate H  as y —  PHF.Eval(K, X) e G, for any x e {0, 1}1. We 
write H(X)  = PHF.Eval(K, X).
A group hash function H  is an (m, n , y ,  8)-programmable hash function if there exist two 
PPT algorithms PHF.TrapGen and PHF.TrapEval such that:
Syntactics:
Correctness:
Statistically-close trapdoor keys:
Well distributed logarithms:
: For g, h e G, the trapdoor key generation (K ', t) — 
PHF.TrapGen(1X, g, h) produces a key K ' along with a 
trapdoor t . Moreover, (aX, bX) —  PHF.TrapEval(t, X)  
produces integers aX and bX for any X  e {0, 1}1.
We demand HK, (X) = P H F .E v a l(K X) = gaXhbX 
for all generators g, h e G and all possible ( K', t) — 
PHF.TrapGen(1X, g, h), for all X  e {0, 1}1 and the cor­
responding (aX, bX) —  PHF.TrapEval(t, X).
For all generators g, h e G and for K —  PHF.Gen(1X) 
and ( K', t) — PHF.TrapGen(1X, g, h), the keys K  and 
K ' are statistically y -close: K = Y K .
For all generators g, h e G  and all possible K ' intherange 
of (the first component of ) PHF.TrapGen(1X, g, h), 
for all X1, . . . ,  X m, Z \ , . . . ,  Zn e {0, 1}1 such that 
Xi  = Zj  for any i, j , and for the corresponding 
(aX,, bXi) —  PHF.TrapEval(t, Xi ) and (aZt , bZt) — 
PHF.TrapEval(t, Zi ), we have
Pr[aXj =• • •  =  aXm = 0 A aZj, . . . ,  aZn = 0 ] >  8
where the probability is over the trapdoor t that was pro­
duced along with K '.
7 The simple script describing the assumption is available upon request.
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